Simulation Model to Evaluate Performance of Operational Systems and their Impact on Repair Shop Activity at a Navy Field Site by Newell, James T.
University of Central Florida 
STARS 
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations 
Fall 1979 
Simulation Model to Evaluate Performance of Operational 
Systems and their Impact on Repair Shop Activity at a Navy Field 
Site 
James T. Newell 
University of Central Florida, jjnewell@nehp.net 
 Part of the Industrial Engineering Commons 
Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/rtd 
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu 
This Masters Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, 
please contact STARS@ucf.edu. 
STARS Citation 
Newell, James T., "Simulation Model to Evaluate Performance of Operational Systems and their Impact on 
Repair Shop Activity at a Navy Field Site" (1979). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 440. 
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/rtd/440 
SIMULATION MODEL TO EVALUATE PERFORMANCE OF 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS AND THEIR IMPACT ON REPAIR SHOP 
ACTIVITY AT A NAVY FIELD SITE 
JAMES T. NEWELL 
B.S.E., University of Central Florida, 1975 
RESEARCH REPORT 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Science: 
Industrial Engineering 
in the Graduate Studies Program of the 
College of ~n~ineering 
at the University of Central Florida; Orlando, Florida 
Fall Quarter 
1979 
ABSTRACT 
This paper presents the - background and procedures 
leading to development of a simulation model to analyze 
the impact of certain decision variables on operational 
system performance and workloads at the repair facility 
of a typical Navy field site. 
The research examines the impact of maintenance sup- 
port concepts, as implemented by changes in the decision 
variables, associated with the broader application of 
Automatic Test Equipment. The initial effort consisted of 
data collection and field site surveys which culminated in 
defining a work flow model illustrating typical repair 
facility operations. 
The work flow model is translated into a computer 
simulation model. The baseline model contains all the 
values for failure rates, delay times, and probability 
decision parameters derived from the available data. 
The simulat.ion model is then exercised and the output 
data recorded for compari.son with historical data to vali- 
date the model and provide a baseline for comparison as 
the decision parameters are varied. Of the variables ex- 
. .. ercised, it appears that the Built-in-Test (BIT),, or 
Self-test capability, is one of the more important design 
considerations in the original operating systems. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Whenever new theories, ideas, and approaches are con- 
sidered for solving existing problem conditipns, a back- 
ground study is usually performed in order to establish ; 
baseline from which to make cost, performance, or other 
data comparisons. In this way, decisions can be made and 
refined for either implementing the new approach, modifying 
it, or discarding it altogether. The maintenance and sup- 
port of Navy training devices, as well as other sophisti- 
cated electronic material, is currently in a critical 
decision realm as to what kind of test and support equip- 
ment is required. In the past, the test equipment has 
consisted of standard meters, oscilloscopes, and the like, 
plus some specially designed "automatic" testers for the 
specific end item being supported.. The most common 
approach for training devices, which are most often one- 
of-a-kind, has been to treat them as a "self-contained" 
system with its own special assignment of maintenance and 
test equipment. Industrial contractors would usually 
design their own specific "automatic" tester for the end 
item training device with the government buying the total 
package deal. 
,-. .,,:i 
. i5 "%. 
,, "f 
. A 
: .1- 
.-. :, 1, - ' 
A -  
,., .;J 
-' 7 ... 
, -2.. 
* ",,, 
. ,  t :2r 
: '.. \': 
- ,, 
, '.+ 
. , . .>. 
.-: , :!I 
- .  h .  .. I,,  
, . ..: ' '; 
. . ) .  . .  ., 
. I  . ", 
. .. 
. . ' I-. 
- Y . .  . 
9 .  . -  1 _ ., 
. - -, 
. > 
. - .  
. \ -  - 
.. - - 
-. . 
. -. ., - ..  .
- .  . 
, . ,  
, . I. 
r , '  
-. . 
.- . 
f / 
, . .- :, 9 8 
. ,? 
r,: :. 
, - ,. - 
. - ,  
. , 
. 1 -  L _  
, , ,f,-: 
. - 
' I ;, -. 
. . 
.,. . 
L _ .  1 ::; . 3, .
=. 1 . .,
'. . t 
:' . ' 1.. . . 
.. ,. , . 
F ,. 
., - . 
i -.,.: 
,' ', - ( '  ' 
I 
. . $;:- ; . ' 
. .  - -  
-., i * 
... .',+ 
,:' -',?. 
- . '  
I .. .,.. 
. . 
. - 8 , .  
?,. . 
; .:: .'. 
. ,ti- 
& - ' , '  
. . . :  
. - .. 
: . . , 
':; :- ->,.< 
l. , 8 -. . ' I  
.. . . 
. 
" ; .  : 
r.,,. :': 
-.. . 
1, "' .,
r. ' 
, - 
)- .; *'( 
t. - 
I I 
7- 8 ,: 
,.. .~ 
.-._ _ . L.. 
5; 
I . ,  
..,.; '-5 
.$, .: 
. . 
2. . - 
,- i. ) I  .il ..,& 
' 
72'' - ' 
- , :  
_ '  I >; ' ,  
5 -  , 
f.-.> 
. . .  
:., . I. . . 
L,. ..A:. 
. ,. . - .% 
--. " -  . & .,. - ;,,< . 
,%.. I ' .  y,t-. , ' 
.- 
v .:- '.',. . 
* . . 
J!, . 
.' 3 .  - :.., 
. ' l o5 ,  ; 
. . 
- . 
d .  
- - 
I- ,J ;. a: 
..! 9 
...a I r , .  . 
r. . .  
r..i 
'(- ; { ., 
.. -, 
' .d 
$., - 
.. - . ;, . , 
_. : 
. .. . 
'.!1 _ 
. , -- ,: . '
, ' 
<- ; 
. .. , 
?;; ~ -.> 
- %. ;. , ' 
~ ,.. 
;'id .. 
- +. F, ' 
. i .- + 
id.. . 1 : 
_,. .. 
,. .., 
) I '  - 
7 .  
,,.. 
:'==; ' 
. - 
. . 
.C' 1 ~ 
. .; .~ .' 5  ..,:.* 
,. -. 
. -.,. 
i! _ :. 
. . .  
" :' .:. 
. . I  ...I 
.. ,., . 
, !. k 
. ., 
. ' 7 1  
., . - 
. '.i. *; 
'- . 
I:", ,,:. f 
:.' . '. 
'. _ L  ? !. -4: 
".;DI.,,' 
- - 
. . 
.. , '  ... 
, ' ,  
. 
.<..  r. ' . 
I:, , . ,, 
. .. 
,; . "' y;.:, ,= : 
.' . 
. .<" .: 
,- . a + ;  
I , :_ 
, , 
. 4 :  
, I : . ,  -.. 
- 48 
. - 
- ..',, - 
% ., 
. . 
, I., 
, . -  
- -.;:;:j 
, 1. 
. (. , .  . 
; 
, .. .?T( 
.. ' 1.. 
2 
Over a period of ti-e, more training devices 
(hereafter called operating systems) would begin accumu- 
lating at various military installations (training sites). 
At the same time, the nissian requirements of these 
systems became more comprehensive requiring much more 
complex equipment. Simple test equipment could no 
longer satisfy the support requirements, and on the 
other hand proliferation of "automatic" testers has 
become increasingly costly . These pressures have focused 
considerable attention toward relocating common test 
equipment to special designated repair sites and develop- 
ment of more universal Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) 
to support a broader range of operating systems. Part 
of the necessary study would be to measure workloads in 
a common repair shop supporting several operating systems 
and the impact on the operating system availability as a 
result of various decision parameter variations. 
It was these concerns that led to a study by the 
Naval Training Equipment Center (NTEC) in 1977. Part 
of this study was concerned with the impact of program- 
ming the ATE to handle the multitude of various elec- 
tronic assemblies in the training device inventory. 
The simulation model developed in this study reproduced 
existing workload conditions at a repair site and simu- 
lated impact created the ATE programming require- 
1 
ment. This model was - bas-ed __  on historical workload data 
2 submitted via the Navy 3-tf data collection system. These 
data were verified by field trips, interviews and observa- 
tions. In general, there was an excellent correlation of 
the data which differed by less than ten percent in the 
quantity of maintenance actions and repairs over a one 
year period between the projections based on interviews 
and observations and those culled from the data collection 
system. This provided a valid'foundation from which to 
develop the simulation model. 
In genera1,'the simulation model developed in this 
study would enable an analyst to observe the flow of 
repair actions through the repair facility resulting from 
the various decision parameters pertinent to the present 
maintenance support concept. From this baseline, observa- 
tions could be made concerning changes in the basic 
approach as well as imple~enting the ATE programming 
requirement with this subsequent impact on the repair shop 
1 George W. Campbell, Intermediate Maintenance Concepts 
and Use of ATE for Training Devices (Preliminary Study) 
(-Orlando, Fla. : Naval Training Equipment Center, 1977), 
pp. 10-11, App. A. 
2 3-M is an acronym derived from the Navy data collec- 
tion system entitled Naval Aviation Maintenance and Mater- 
ial Management System introduced on 1 January 1965. This 
system is a part of The Naval Aviation Maintenance Program 
(.NAME'), which was originated on.26 Nay 1959. Although 
there have been substantial revisions to the program, the 
term "3-M" is still popularly used when referring to the 
maintenance data collection portion of the current NAbP 
introduced on 18 June 1973 by OPNAV Instruction 4790-28. 
4 
workload. The principaL-abj ective of this first model was 
to assess the ATE programming impact. Therefore, sample 
programming times were collected from observations and 
from manufacturers of ATE,-then used in the model as 
additional repair cycle delays. The results showed that 
it was not possible to levy this additional requirement 
for programming on the repair shop personnel. As a conse- 
quence, it was determined that a more comprehensive study 
concerning the application of ATE was needed. It was 
during this second study that the more comprehensive simu- 
lation model presented herein was developed. 
Objectives of Research Project 
The principal objective of this research is to 
develop a simulation model which can be used to evaluate 
the impact on operating system performance and repair 
facility workloads due to changes in maintenance support 
concepts. These support concepts are implemented by 
several decision variables that could be altered by the 
introduction of ATE into a typical Navy repair facility 
supporting trainer systems, To realize this objective 
required the analysis of the present real-world system, 
developing the work flow diagram representing this 
system, developing the simulation model of this system, 
and then exercising the model with changes in various 
decision order 
- -- 
make j udgnent s concerning parameters 
reactions the system these parameter variations. 
Specific objectives of the simulation model concerned 
the ability to observe variations in the performance of 
the systems and.changes in workloads resulting from 
certain decision parameter changes. These major decision 
parameters were: (1) Built-in-Test (BIT) or self-test 
accuracy, (-2) probability of having spare parts, (3) per- 
formance test accuracy, and (4) diagnostic test accuracy. 
The most significant performance measure of an 
operating system is its operational availability, or per- 
centage of up-status time. Parameters (I), C.3)' and (4) 
all concern the ability to correctly detect a failed item 
and properly restore a downed operating system to an "up" 
condition, while parameter C2) provides a means of rapidly 
restoring the system. These parameters w i - 1 1  be varied and 
the resulting changes in operating system availability and 
workloads observed for the systems and repair shop points. 
The following sections describe the development of 
the simulation model from the beginning of establishing 
the work flow structure, through the application of pro- 
gramming techniques to solve the required system opera- 
tions, to the exercising of the model to obtain statisti- 
cal information related to the operating system perform- 
ance and the repair shop workloads. 
General Description of the Model 
After surveying several field ,sites, a general work 
flow description of the opgrating systems and repair 
activities was developed. All maintenance and repair 
activities can be generalized into three encompassing 
categories which are depicted in Figure 1. These activi- 
ties consist of: (1) The operating systems at each field 
site, (-2) a local repair activity at each field site, and 
(3) a depot or other remote site from the field site. 
Maintenance and support of the operating system is 
the primary objective of all repair activity. Trouble- 
shooting, maintenance and repair of the operating system 
consists of using the system's built-in tests and self- 
diagnostic routines as well as other on-line testing and 
investigation. This testing is used in an attempt to 
isolate the fault in the system. Failed or suspect mater- 
ial is then removed from the system and either replaced 
by a spare, or repaired and then replaced. 
The second phase of this maintenance and support 
consists of those activities normally confined to the 
established site repair shop. Failed or suspect material 
(-hereafter called "failed materialu) is funneled into the 
repair shop from all the operating systems at the site. 
Decisions must be made as to whether the repair of the 
perating 
System 2 P 
Operating 
h 
Depot 
Repair 
Field Site 1 Qr B 
Salvage, 
.P L 
Site n 
Repair 
Shop 
4 L 
\ 
Field Site n 
2 Fig. 1: General Flow of Failed Items 
material is within the capability -. .- and training of the shop 
personnel or whether equipment exists at the repair shop to 
perform the required repair functions. After processing 
through the repair shop, "good" material is forwarded to 
the operating system for an on-line verification test while 
material that is still "defective" is shipped elsewhere. 
These decisions are made at various points in the normal 
work flow. 
Failed material that cannot be handled in the repair 
shop is shipped to either a depot facility or the -original 
manufacturer. Here the materrals may be repaired or sal- 
vaged, For the objectives of this study, this latter is 
not required to be modeled. Therefore, failed naterial 
reaching these decision points will be. assumed to have 
immediate replacements available and the system returned 
to operational status. 
The flow structure i.s the same regardless of the 
number of operating systems per site. In this manner, the 
impact on the repair shop workloads and the sensitivities 
of individual operating systems can be measured when 
system decision parameters are varied. Impact on the 
repair shop workload could also be measured by adding or 
deleting operating systems, but thi.s was not done in this 
particular study. The programing, which will be discussed 
later, was structured in such a way that a complete oper- 
ating system simulation section could be inserted or 
deleted without disturbing --- the repair shop simulation 
program routine. 
In Figure 1, the block labeled Field Site 1 repre- 
sents a collection of operating systems at a typical Navy 
site. This block can represent several operating systems 
and in this study consisted of six individual systems, 
Failures occurring in any one system could result in a flow 
of failed material into the block labeled Site 1 Repair 
Shop. I.nformation needed to es'tahlish -the baseline opera- 
ting conditions of each system included the systeni mean- 
time-between0.f ailures CmBF) , the 'av~rage complexity of the 
failed material, mean-time--to-.diagnose the 'fault on-line, 
probability of correct fault isolation, probability of 
available spare,' and mean verification time 'after repair 
was made.' Appendix E gives a facsimile 'of the field survey 
sheet for System 1, 
From the survey sheet, data on line S1 establishes the 
interarrival time of failure occurences wMle line S2 forms 
the probability of low, medium, or high complexity material 
being the fault source, In like manner the other data 
lines form the bases for the program parameters described 
later. A similar survey sheet provi.ded the data used in 
the Site 1 Repair Shop for mean delay times associated 
with performance testing , diagnostic testing , and the 
actual repair of the failed material. Repaired material 
is then returned to the operating system for on~*line 
JAc  , 
- 7. 
verification tests. . ,  - - . 2 ' l l 2  - 1 .I - 
-4:- ,;-> -&- - 
- - 1  / 
After establishing the baseline parameters and opera- 
ting logic, which is described more fully in the next 
section, the model was exercised for four quarterly periods 
to form the. baseline output data. Decision variables 
selected to alter were those described in the "Objectives" 
section. Four new quarterly periods were run for each 
single change in a decision variable.. The major observa- 
tion variable for each data period was the system opera- 
tional availability. Other observations included the work- 
loads and total expended delay (maintenance) times, 
Although the objective of this research was to 
develop a practical simulation model which could he used 
to observe the 'lmpact of changes due 'to decision variab1e.s ,
the. actual significance of those changes would be of 
interest in the overall conclusions. As an example, it 
can be seen that there are random deviations in the quar- 
terly availabilities for any given system, Is the 
avai-lability deviation due to decision variable change 
significantly different from the .availability deviatton 
due to the random failure pattern? Appendix F presents an 
3 Analysis of Variance CALJOVA) test for the data produced 
for System 2 as a result of changes in self-test accuracy, 
3 Isaac N, Gibra,' Probabil'Lty and 'Stati'sti'cal Infer- 
ence for Scientists and Engineers CEnglewood cliffs', X. J 
Prentice-Hall, Inc. , 1973) pp,  337-48 .  
The MJOVA test shows that-the -- - hypothesis of equal means 
(mean availability) is rejected at the -05  level of signif- 
icance and it is concluded that the mean availability due 
to the self-test accuracy &s significantly different than 
the nean availability due to random failure for System 2. 
A similar analysis on System 1 does not reject the hypo- 
thesis of equal means. These tests can provide a basis for 
alternative conclusions for each specific system which are 
not addressed in any detail insthis study. They also help 
establish a "feel" for the regression equations which were 
used in forming some basic conclusions concerning the model 
output data. 
In addition, a multi-regression analysis was performed 
for System 2, as an example, to help verify which decision 
variable is more significant among those altered during the 
study. This analysis is presented in Ap2endix G. 
In the comparative analysis of these type tests, it 
can be seen that the nean availability of the quarterly 
periods can be the most useful data element for preliminary 
conclusions. These mean values were then used in single 
regression applications of each decision variable on the 
observed mean availability since the treatment of each 
variable separately leads to the same conclusion as the 
analysis presented in Appendix G. 
11. DEVELOPMENT OF TEE IvfODEL 
General Lorzic' .o'f the Yo'del 
The general logic  of the model consists  of two phases; 
(1) the on-line phase (operating system), and C2) the off -  
l i ne  phase Crepair shop). During the on-line phase, the 
model creates malfunctions a t  the pre-determined r a t e  
computed from the survey data for  each operating system. 
After the malfunction i s  created, i t  i s  assigned a com- 
plexity level  based on the percentage values from the sur- 
vey data Cline S2 of Appendix El, The malfunction i s  
delayed i n  t r a n s i t  through-the model by the 'amount of  
time assigned to  the BI.T,  or s e l f - t e s t  procedure, and i s  
then assigned a 'Y-rue" f a i l u r e  ' s ta tus  based upon th.e 
accuracy of the se l f - - t es t .  Themodel then assigns a spare. 
base.d on the probabil i ty values from the surveys. I f  
there were no spare, the f a i l ed  material goes to  the  repair  
shop. I f  there i s  a spare, i t  i s  ins ta l l ed  and a ver i f ica-  
t ion t e s t  pe.rformed, A GO decision a t  t h i s  point sends the 
fa i l ed  material t o  the- repai r  shop while a NO GO causes a 
recycle . in  search of another f a u l t  source. 
In  the o f f - l ine  phase, a decision i s  f i r s t  made to 
des t roy the  material or attempt repa i r .  I f  a repair  i s  to  
be attempted, the materia-L i s  subj-e-cted to  a performance 
verif icat ion t e s t .  Decisions and delays are implemented 
by data parameters from the s i t e  surveys. The material may 
pass or f a i l  a t  t h i s  point, ga t e r i a l  fa i l ing  the t e s t  
goes into the diagn0sti.c t e s t  w h i l  those 'passing go back 
for  on-line t e s t s .  
Diagnostic test ing de.ci.sions and de1,ays are. .again 
computed from s i t e  survey data and the material e i ther  
goes i n  for  physical repair  or recycled to  the* .performance 
t e s t .  After repair ,  a second performance t e s t  i s  exer- 
cised for  verif icat ion of the f i x .  The material then goes 
back to  the on-line phase i f  i t  passes, or back to  diagnos- 
t i c  t e s t s  i f  i t  f a i l s .  
The de ta i l  functional requirements of the  model are 
described i n  the following sections,  
Detailed Oper a't'ing. Requ'iremen t's' bY 'the Model 
The Operating Sys tern Con-Line) Phase 
The overall flow'of a typical operating system i s  
\ 
shown i n  Figure 2 .  The i n i t i a t i on  of the sequence of work 
flow events pertaining to  each operating system begins 
w i t h  the appearance of a malfunction and i t s  related sus- 
pect fa i lu re .  As previously noted, several operating 
Fig. 2: Operating System Model (Typical) 
Operating System (On-Line) 1 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - -  
Repair Shop (Off -Line) 
No 
I 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Apparent 
Defective 
Item to Shop 
Go I 
I 1  * 
Defective 
Item to 
Shop 
systems may be on-line si.multaneously and feeding failed 
material (-Figure 1) into the repair shop. Block descrip- 
tions of the operating system. as shown by Figure 2, and 
required decision parameters associated with these blocks 
are addressed. in the following paragraphs: 
Block S1: Block S1 is used to represent the origination 
of failures and/or malfunctions in the operating system. 
In normal operations, this tends to be a random process 
following well-known reliabilie distributions and becomes 
-, .$!&' ; 
a characteristic parameter of the system components, - . 
- . . -, '3. ' 3 
design, and maintenance procedures among other things. The 
actual values used to represent this random process were 
taken from site surveys and later substantiated via the 
Navy 3-M reporting system. Malfunctions represented by 
Block S1 generally place the operating system in a DOWN 
status. 
Block S2: Block S2 is used to assign a complexity level 
each transactions generated Block The 
complexity of failed material is generally classified as 
low, medium, or high. In this manner, test and repair times 
can be differentiated ' within the model for various complex- 
ities such as a simple amplifier module or a high density 
aigital-logic module. The basis for assigning these corn- 
plexity factors was derive'd from the site surveys and 
assigned on a percentage basis for each operating system. 
This assignment, then, becomes one of the required identi- 
16 
fication parameters..carrfed through the model as part of 
the failed material specification. Thus, each transaction 
representing failed material must be labeled with a set of 
parameter values that will,-in general, differ from the 
values carried by all other transactions. As the model is 
developed, the identification of required decision condi- 
tions then leads to the appropriate transaction parameter 
labeling. These labels create a unique specification for 
each transaction moving through the model. 
Block S3:, Block S3 represents the process whereby a failed 
item is systematically isolated and identified by various 
means of on-line testing. Most operating systems have a 
certain degree of Built-in-Test CBIT) capability and most 
. . havesome form of diagnostic s e l f - t k s ~ ' : r o u t ~ h ~ ~ - ,  'in 'add%-. 
d- tion to the@:, technician tro.uble&hoot.ing with $adous.  
test equipment also represented within this 
block. The mean delay time represented at this block will 
generally depend upon the quality of these operating system 
self-test aids and the complexity level of the failed item 
signified by the incoming transaction from Block S 2 .  , 
Block S4: Block S4 labels each entering transaction as a 
m 
failure or non-failure. Assignment of actual failure to 
the transaction function the accuracy the self - 
test routines denoted by Block S3. The accuracy of the 
self-test routines is highly dependent on the amount of 
17 
money allotted for that particular part of the equipment 
__, ---- - 
design and does not necessarily reflect faulty design or 
limited technology. In addition, the complexity level of 
the failed material has a decided impact on the ability to 
correctly identify the true failure. In one particular 
operating system, for example, approximately eight percent 
of all high complexity material identified as failed during 
the self-test routine actually had no faults at all. In 
this case, Block S 4  would have labeled ninety-two percent 
of all incoming high complexity transactions as failures 
and the remaining eight percent as non-failures. Each 
transaction would then continue through the model to the 
subsequent decision points regardless of failure status. 
Block S 5 :  Block S 5  is used to determine whether a spare 
item is available to replace the failed material. The 
method for implementing this block was influenced by the 
objectives of the model. Since the operating system and 
repair shop parameters were to be varied, the spares 
availability was assigned on a probability basis rather 
than a deterministic basis. In this way, a pure system 
response was obtained based on an infinite pool of spares 
drawn on a historical probability basis only. If a finite 
pool of spares were originally available, the system 
response would become discontinuous whenever the spares 
supply was depleted and this would interrupt the desired 
response observations. 
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When the determinat.ion is made that there is no spare, 
the failed material (regardless of true failure status) 
I 
will exit to the repair shop (Point I). If a spare is 
available, the flow continues to Block S6. 
Block S6: Block S6 represents the function of inserting 
the replacement spare into the operating system for verifi- 
cation that the correct failed material has been isolated 
by Block S3. In general, if the original isolated material 
was the true failure, a GO condition should be present. 
When a GO is obtained, then the failed material exits to 
the repair shop at Point I and the operating system returns 
to UP status. A NO GO will normally be obtained if an 
error weremade in the original isolation procedure of 
Block S3. When this occurs, the transaction must be cycled 
back and reenter the flow at Block S2. These re-entering 
transactions will take priority over malfunctions coming 
from Block S1. In other words, if the operating system is 
down due to a malfunction, all attempts to correct that 
malfunction will take place before attention is diverted to 
any subsequent malfunction that may occur during the pro- 
cess of operations, troubleshooting, or verification. 
Blocks S7 and S 8 :  Blocks S7 and S8 (Figure 3) represent 
points of access to the operating system for purposes of 
verification of the findings of the repair shop. In 
general, they are identical to Block S6. Again, GO, NO GO 
decisions will depend on the true status of the failed 
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material. At Block S7, the-failed material will have gone 
through Block 82 without showing any fault present. At 
Block S7, if a GO is obtained, the item will either be 
returned to RFI (Ready-for-Lssue) status, or the operating 
system returned to UP status. This decision depends on the 
system status when the GO conditidn is obtained. If a NO 
GO is obtained, the failed material reenters the repair 
shop routine at Block Rl. The same operating procedure 
exists at Block SS except that iE a NO GO is obtained, the 
material, having cycled through all the repair shop capa- 
bilities, is now shipped to depot or salvage (Point 11). 
At this time the operating system is arbitrarily placed 
in UP status and normal operations continue. 
At all times, failed material flowing through the 
model must be traceable to the original operating system. 
In other words, Blocks S7 and S8 belong to the original 
system and cannot be arbitrary test points. Failed material 
from operating System 2 cannot be forwarded to operating 
System 1 for verification, etc. Therefore, a system label 
must also be one of the parameters of the failed material 
transaction. 
The Repair Shop (-Off -Line) Phase 
The overall flow of the repair shop routine is shown 
in Figure'3. This phase of the model reflects the sequence 

of events from the entry -of failed material into the 
repair shop (Point I) from the operating systems. The 
material passes through tests, inspections, and repair 
actions and will periodically be forwarded to the original 
operating system for on-line verification tests. Blocks R2, 
R3 and R5 contain intricate decision conditions and will be 
addressed more specifically in a later section. The gen- 
eral description of the repair shop blocks and the required 
decision parameters associated with them are as follows: 
Block R1: Decisions made at Block R1 depend on the main- 
tenance philosophy associated with the operating system. 
A certain percentage of failed material will not even have 
a repair attempt made. Therefore, probability levels were 
established for each operating system through site 'surveys . 
anddata analyses. In this way, the model forwards the 
failed material to either Block R2, or out of the model at 
Point 11, with the established probability values. If the 
failed material proceeds to Point 11, the operating 
system is assumed to return to an UP status if it had been 
DOWN because of that particular failure. The decision to 
attempt repair or not will also depend on the complexity 
level of the incoming failed material and, in general, 
different probability decision levels will exist for each 
complexity class. 
Block R2: Block R2 is designated as the Performance 
Verification Subroutine CPVS) . It is shown in more detail 
in Figure 4 and will be discussed more specifically in the 
next section. Failed material enters the block at point 
"a" and may exit either at point "b" or point "c". Speci- 
fic parameter identifications of failed material entering 
at point "a" of Block R2 will distinguish.it from failed 
material entering point "a" of Block R5. Block R2 repre- 
sents testing processes on the incoming failed material 
in order to establish the overall performance, or non- 
performance, of the item. If the failed material shows no 
fault, whether one is present or not, it will exit at 
point "c". Likewise if it shows a fault, whether present 
or not, it will exit at point "b" and proceed to Block R3. 
The exception to this occurs when an item returns from 
Block R3, is processed through Block R2 again, and is then 
forced to exit Block R2 at point "b" by a priority decision. 
Failed material exiting point "c" of Block R2 will always 
go to Block S7 of the original operating system for on- 
line verification. 
Block R3: Block R3 is designated as the Diagnostic Test 
Subroutine (-DTS) which. is more involved than a performance 
verification test. Here, the attempt to completely isolate 
and identify the specific failed part, or parts, on an 
assembly is made. Diagnostics, in general, are more in- 
volved and more costly than performance tests. Failed 
material enters the block at point "a". Exits may occur 
11  1 1 1  at points "b", "c", or a depending on decisions internal 
to Block R 3 .  The block is _ _  - shown - in more detail in Figure 5 
and will be discussed more specifically in the next section. 
Processing decisions will cause the failed material 
to exit at point "c" if no fault can be found regardless 
of whether one is present or not. It will normally exit 
at point "b" if a fault is indicated, whether or not one 
is actually present. Exits at point "d" usually result 
when the extent of damage is too great for local repair, or 
if it is finally determined to be beyond the repair shop's 
capabilities. 
Exits from point "c" are recycled to Block R 2 .  These 
items are given a higher priority in order to expedite 
their processing in Blocks R2 and R3. This priority 
affects the decision parameters and the order of procedure 
within these blocks. They will not, however, preempt any 
work or tests in process, This priority assignment will 
eventually force the failed material to exit point "b" of 
Block R2 and also point "b" of Block R3 on the subsequent 
pass through these blocks; 
Block R4:  Block R 4  represents the actual physical repair 
action on all failed material entering it. At this block, 
it is assumed that all repair attempts are successtul in 
the fact that specific instructions from the diagnostic 
testing results are implemented. It is further considered 
that no new faults will be- introduced due to th.e repair 
shop activity. In essence, all material exiting Block R 4  
will be in a non-failure--status. The Mean Time to Repair 
(PITTR) associated with this block was derived from site 
surveys and analyses of the Navy 3-M data for the different 
complexity levels. 
Block R5 : Block R5 represents the final performance veri- 
fication process which validates the diagnostic and repair 
actions. It is the same physical activity that is also 
represented by Block R2.  Therefore, transactions entering 
point "a" of Block R5 require labeling such that on-line 
verification attempts will go to Block S8 of the correct 
operating system and not Block S 7 .  In addition, due to the 
probability conditions within Block R5, a good item may 
exit point "b", having failed the performance tests, and be 
returned to Block R3 for additional diagnostic testing. 
This is a function of the Performance Verification Sub- 
routine capabilities, even though the item was repaired at 
Block R4. This portion of the flow routine is necessary 
because the repair technicians have no knowledge of the 
true failure status of the repaired item, nor can their 
equipment yield 100 percent accuracy, and the item must 
pass the tests before b'eing certified as R F I .  
Those items returning to Block R3 are assigned a 
higher priority in order to expedite their processing on 
the subsequent pass through the blocks. These items are 
forced to exit point "b" of Block R3 and point "c" of Block 
R5 on their subsequent pass through the blocks. All 
repaired items exiting ppint "c" of Block R5 will always go 
to Block S8 of the original operating system from which 
they came for on-line verification tests. 
Internal Functional Details of Blocks R2,  
R3, and R5 
Performance Verification Blocks R2 and R5 
The Performance Verification Subroutine block is shown 
in detail in Figure 4. This block contains the actual per- 
formance testing routines and several decision subblocks 
which are based on the accuracy of these tests. The sub- 
, 
block functions are : 
Subblock P1: Performance Verification Tests 
Subblock P2: Failure Status Determination 
Subblock P3 : Failure Indication 
Subblock P4: Failure Indication 
Subblock P1 represents the process of actually perform- 
ing those tests necessary to verify the overall performance 
of the incoming failed material. The mean time to perform 
these tests will depend on the type of test equipment being 
used and the complexity level of the failed material being 
processed. 
Subblock P2 examines the incoming failed (or repaired) 
material to ascertain its true failure status. This infor- 
nation, being unknown to the technicians, is used to route 
the material to either Subblock P3 or Subblock P4. 
Subblock P3 operates on the probability that a true 
failure will have been properly detected by the tests of 
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Fig. 5: Diagnostic Test Routine 
Subblock PI. The probabili~y levels assigned to this sub- 
block, as well as Subblock P4, are based on the field 
survey data and generally ref-lect the sophistication of 
the test equipment involved-. If a true failure has been 
identified by Subblock P1 as a failure, the failed material 
will eventually exit point "b". If it was not detected as 
"failed", it exits point "c". 
Subblock P4 works on the same principle as Subblock P3. 
However, this subblock operates 'on the probability that a 
"non-failed" item may pass through the test showing either 
a failure or non-failure. In other words, due to the ambi- 
guities of the test equipment, or technician, a non-failed 
itern may exit point "b" due to an erroneous fault indica; 
tion. If it shoes no fault, it will exit point "c". 
In general, the majority of failed material will exit 
point "b" while the majority of non-failed items will exit 
point "c". This flow routine is maintained for all trans- 
actions except those given a higher priority elsewhere in 
the model. Subblocks P3 and P4 are therefore a measure of 
performance verification comprehensiveness as far as the 
capability of eliminating false alarms and undetected 
failures. 
Diagnostic Test Block R3 
The Diagnostic Test Subroutine block is show in 
detail in Figure 5. This block represents the most in- 
depth testing and diagnostic capability within the repair 
shop. Whereas the performance tests generally indicate a 
decision capability, the diagnostic tests 
actually isolate and identify the specific failure. component 
within an assembly or group-of components in preparation 
for the physical repair of the failed material. In other 
words, the performance test may verify that an amplifier 
has no out~ut, but the diagnostic test will find the open 
or shorted transistor or IC chips. This block, then, con- 
tains the actual test routines and several decision sub- 
blocks which are based on the accuracy of these tests. The 
subblock functions are: 
Subblock Dl: Diagnostic Tests 
Subblock D2: Retention Decision 
Subblock a3: Failure Status Determination 
Subblock D 4 :  Failure Indication 
Subblock D5: Failure Indication 
Subblock Dl represents the process of actually perform- 
ing those tests necessary to isolate the faulty part or 
component on the incoming failed material. The mean time 
to perform these tests will generally depend on the type of 
test equipment used and th-e complexity level of the failed 
material befng processed. 
Subblock D2 represents a closer inspectionof the 
failed material in order to determine whether it can be 
repaired in th.e shop. It would also consist of screening 
out those items too badly damaged to be retained. This 
subblock works on a probability basis derived from the 
site surveys. If the item is not retained, it will exit 
point "d", otherwise, the _ __.- flow is to Subblock D3. The com- 
plexity level of the failed material will influence the 
probability decision levels; failures in high comp-lexity 
material are generally more-difficult to isolate than those 
in low complexity material. 
Subblock D3 examines the incoming material to ascer- 
tain its true failure status. This information, being 
unknown to the technician, is used to route the material 
to either Subblock D4 or Subblock D5. 
Subblock D4 operates on the probability that a true 
failure will have been properly identified by the tests 
of Subblock Dl. The probability levels assigned to this 
subblock, as well as those 'of Subblock D5, are based on the 
field survey data and reflects the sophistication of the 
test equipment and procedures involved. If a true failure 
has been correctly isolated by Subblock Dl, it will exit 
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point V ~ I V .  If it was incorrectly diagnosed as a non- 
failure, will exit point 
Subblock D5 works on the 'same principle as Subblock 
D4. In contrast to Subblock D4, this subblock operates on 
the probability that a %on-failed" item may pass through 
the tests of Subblock Dl indicating either a failure or 
non-failure. Again, due to ambiguities in test equipment, 
procedures or technicians, a non-failed item may exit 
point "b" due to an erroneous fault indication. If it 
shows no fault, it will exit point "c". 
In general, the majo.r.iLy of failed material will exit 
point "b" while the majority of non-failed material will 
exit point "c". This flow routine is maintained for all 
transactions except those assigned a higher priority else- 
where in the model. Subblocks D 4  and D5 are therefore a 
measure of diagnostic comprehensiveness as far as the 
capability of isolating the true cause of failure and the 
elimination of false alarms. 
111. PROGRAMMING THE SIMULATIOfJ MODEL 
General Description of the Programming Language 
The programming language used in this simulation model 
is entitled FLOW SIMULATOR, or sometimes FLOWSIM for short. 
The best general des.cription is that the language consists 
of: Cl) dynamic entities called "transactions" which repre- 
sent some unit of reality moving through the system, 
(-2) equipment entities that represent elements of the 
system acted upon by the transaction, (3) statistical 
entities that. are 'designed for the'purpose of measuring 
the system' s behavior, and (4) operational entities called 
"blocks" that provide the logic for directing the trans- 
actions through th.e system. The language is a free form 
style containing four fields and requiring a single space 
to separate th.e fields in the statements, However, for . 
sake of clarity, th.e 'following conventions are generally 
observed : 
(-1) Colums 1 - 8 Location or Reference Field 
C2) Columns 10 - 18 Operational Field 
(3). Columns 20 - xx Variable Field 
( 4 )  Columns 40 -- 80 Comments or Remarks 
The Location Field is used for labels and identifying 
tags which are called, or addressed, by other program state- 
ments. They serve the same-general function as FORTRAN 
numbered statements used for GO TO'S, DO'S, etc. The 
simulation automatically assigns sequential block numbers 
to operational program statements for use in the output 
report. When the Location Field is used for a label name, 
this name supercedes the block identification number. 
Labeling is optional and may be used because of the need to 
11 go to" that particular block from other parts of the pro- 
gram, or simply for user identification in place of block 
numbers in the output. 
The Operational Field is mandatory and provides the 
basic directional control of the system. The operational 
field contains such. statements as SEIZE, RELEASE, ASSIGN, 
TRANSFER, and other system control functions. 
The Variable Field is used to specify and/or modify 
the requirements dictated by the Operational Field. It 
consists of subfields A through G which are used as 
required by the programmer and have various specifications 
related to the type of statement in the Operational Field. 
For instance, Subfield A represents a mean delay time for 
an ADVANCE statement, but is used as a probability, or 
percentage value, in a TRAIJSFER statement. The Variable 
Field uses as many columns as necessary for complete 
specification, provided there are no embedded blanks in 
the field. Subfields not used are set apart by commas 
until the last required subfield is specified. 
The Comment Field uses -descriptive information as an 
aid to the programmer and/or reader. Comments do not 
enter into the simulation program but are reproduced at 
the output on the program listing. Additional comments 
can be entered anywhere in the program by placing an 
asterisk C*) in column one of the statement. Then all 
eighty columns are treated as comments. 
More specific language details will be discussed as 
required in the programming of tge nodel. For additional 
FLOW SIMULATOR informati-on the reader should refer to the 
reference manual. 4 In addition, brief general descriptions 
of the more popular GPSS often appear in textbooks on 
Queueing Theory and adequately apply to the general des- 
crip t ion of FLOW SIlfULATOR . 5 
4 Sperry Rand-Univac, Flow Simulator Reference Manual, 
Series 70 Publications CCinnaminson, N.J.: Sperry Rand, 
'~onald Gross and Carl M. Harris, Fundainentals of 
Queuing Theory (~ew York: John Wiley Er Sons, 1974)  , 
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Pro~rarnmin~ the-Operating System Phase 
Establishing the Transaction Specifications 
Although normal computer program documenta~lon usually 
contains a flow chart, a subtle advantage of FLOW SIMULATOR 
is that one can usually program directly from the system 
definition or flow diagram. Therefore, no separate flow 
chart is given and the programming is developed from the 
system descriptions referred to in Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
In Figure 2, the initiation of activity begins at 
Block S1 which represents system failures. This corres- 
ponds directly to the GENERATE statement. Subfield A of 
the GENERATE contains the mean arrival rate at which a 
transaction occurs. From the site surveys and later 3-M 
substantiation, the mean-time-between-failures CMTBF) was 
computed for the system and entered in terms of minutes to 
improve accuracy and also because the simulation language 
cannot work in fractions. Therefore 1.6 hours would be 
96 minutes, a whole number. Subfield B is the mean time 
modifier , and for equipment reliability, follows an 
exponential distribution. This is defined by a function 
statement called EXPON which appears near the end of the 
program listing. So Subfields A and B uniquely define the 
Poisson arrival Cexponential inter-arrival) of transactions 
representing the failures of each operating system. In 
order to measure statistics more readily, each. operating 
system program routine is. identical except for those system 
parameters and decision probabilities unique to a specific 
system. In essence, the corresponding Operational Fields 
of each operating system simulation program is identical 
with only their corresponding Variable Fields differing . 
After analyzing the system operating requirements it 
was determined that a minimum of three basic identification 
parameters was required for each transaction. During the 
programming it was later found that four more parameters 
were required for special routines and comparison tests. 
The following parameter descriptions are gi6en: 
Parameter 1: Complexity Level 
1 = Low Complexity 
2 = Medium Complexity 
3 = High Complexity 
Parameter 2: Failure Status 
0 = Non-failure 
1 = Failure 
Parameter 3 : Subroutine Selection Mode (SBR) 
This parameter is reserved for the special SBR TPANS- 
FER function. Whenever this mode is selected, the block 
number from which the transfer was made is automatically 
stored in Parameter 3. and the transaction moves to the 
called SBR block. At the end of the subroutine, the trans- 
action can return to the normal program flow at any desired 
. point with the statement, TRANSFER P,3,X which adds "X" 
units to the block number stored in Parameter 3. "X" can 
be any numerical value. 
Parameter 4: Operating SysGem Identification. 
This parameter is used to uniquely identify the 
original operating system in which the failure, or trans- 
action, occurred. One of the most beneficial functions 
used in the simulation is th-e Parameter Selection Xode (P) 
of the TRANSFER statements. By storing a block number 
(similar to the automatic SBR function) in Parameter 4, 
tests can easily be made such that transactions are 
returned to any point in th.e pro$ram by the statement 
TRANSFER P,X,Y where "Xtr is the parameter number and "Y" 
the number units added block number represented 
by "Xu. However, extreme 'caution is required due to the 
fact that program change which upsets the sequential 
block numbers can invalidate the TRANSFER P,X,Y statement. 
Tkerefore, most of these 'statements have been addended 
with the "BLOCK NUMBER"' , for rapid identifi- 
cation and review. 
Parameter 5: Criticality Identification 
0 = Non-critical, spare was available 
1 = Critical, no spare available 
Th.is parameter was used to identify those transactions 
entering the repair s b p  without having a replacement 
spare. In other words, the 'operating system would he in 
DOWN status awaiting the .repair of this item. However, no 
special priority is given to the transaction. 
Parameter 6: On-Line Test--Block Identification 
6  = Block S 6  
7 = Block S7 
8 = Block S8 
At appropriate points in the model, the transactions 
would be labeled with one of the numbers 6, 7, or 8 in 
this parameter to identify which on-line test position is 
to be utilized for the on-line verification tests. The 
parameter also used identify appropriate QUEUE 
set up to measure backlog at these points in the model. 
Parameter 7: Clock Tine of Failure 
In testing a transaction to determine if it was the 
specific one causing a DOWN system status, some unique 
attribute had to be developed. It was determined that: 
Cl) due to the basic definition of the random generator, 
no two failures within the same system could occur at the 
exact same clock time, and C2) since the internal trans- 
action number could not be accessed by the user, that this 
would be the only truly unique parameter among all th-e 
possible permutations of identifying parameters of the 
transaction. This parameter was needed to identify those 
transactions returning from the repair shop for on-line 
tests at Blocks S7 and S 8  (Figure 3) which may have the 
system held in a DOWN status. 
These seven parameters then, completely define each 
original transaction and through parameter changes within 
38 
the model, provide c.omplet-e-and accurate routing instruc- 
tions to all transactions. 
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Operating Sys tern---Program Block Functions 
(Blocks 1-60) 
Program blocks discussed in the following paragraphs 
refer directly to the program listing in Appendix A. The . 
block numbers appear in the lefthand column of the listing. 
Block 1: Having established the parameter requirements, 
the GENERATE statements could now be com~letely defined for 
each operating system. Subfields D and E were not required, 
so that the value "7" was placed' in Sub£ ield F and the 
letter "F" placed in Subfield G indicating that the para- 
meters had to be FULLWORD (4 Bytes) lengths in order to 
accommodate th-e clock 'time. Even though all the other 
parameters need only IiALF\JOIW lengths, they cannot be 
separately specified. A five clock unit (minutes) offset 
was specified in Subfield C in order to avoid "premature" 
failures that might conflict with. a parameter change value 
of "1" used in Parameter 7 later in th.e program. In other 
words, a failure at one minute after starting wasn't 
allowed. This could have been changed to a one minute 
offset and the value "0" used later in Parameter 7, hut 
there does not appear to be any measurable impact on sys- 
tem results. The only impact of the value in Subfield C 
is to set the limit for the earliest possible occurence 
of the first transaction. 
Block. 2 : During th.e development of the programming, 
periodic use of the T U C E  capability was made. This pro- 
vided a complete audit t.r-ail of the movement of a trans- 
action through the system. Idhen the debugging proved 
satisfactory the TPACE was removed. In order to avoid 
extensive changes to the Pgrameter Selection Mode TRANSFER 
statements, the TPACE was merely replaced by an ADVANCE 0 
statement. This maintained the order of the sequential 
block numbers without causing any simulation change. 
Execution of an ADVANCE 0 requires no clock time usage and 
is immaterial to the simulation 'model. 
Block 3: The operating system identification is placed in 
Parameter 4 by an ASSIGN statement. The numerical value 
(-24) corresponds to the block number for the QUEUE repre- 
senting items awaiting the use of Block S6 of Figure 2 or 
Blocks S7 and S 8  of Figure 3. 
Block 4: This block is a QUEUE to measure the number of 
transactions entering the system. In addition, if the 
system is in DOWN status, no new transaction can enter to 
SEIZE the system and it must remain in the QUEUE, 
Block 5: This block tests the system status in order 
to allow transactions to leave the QUEUE and SEIZE. the 
system only when the system is UP. 
Block 6 : Transactions SEIZE '3ng the system create DOWN 
status situations and represent failures entering the flow 
model. 
Block 7: This block places the clock time when the trans- 
action was created into Parameter 7. 
Block 8 : The clock time-. in-Parameter 7 is transcribed 
into a SAVEVALUE location for later tests. Notice that no 
change can occur in this value until a new transaction is 
allowed into the system, or-as long as the system is DOIJN. 
Blocks 10-16: These program blocks perform the function 
of Block S2 in Figure 2. By using the probability TRANSFEX 
modes in blocks 10 and ll., the. transaction i s  routed to the 
appropriate ASSIGN statement. After ASSIGN'ing the com- 
plexity number in Parameter 1, all transactions are 
"Unconditionally" TMJSFER'ed to Block 17 in the program. 
The probabilities used in the TRANSFER blocks C10 and 11) 
were derived from the kite. 'surveys, 
Block 17: - This block provides the appropriate delay time 
corresponding to Block S3 of Figure 2. The time and 
estimated distribution was derived from the site surveys 
and is implemented by the operational ADVANCE statement. 
Variable Subfield A is the mean delay time and Subfzeld B 
represents the spread 'C+), -. A uniform distribution was used 
in most ADVANCE statements due 'to a lack of knowledge of 
the actual time distributions, which are most likely log- 
normal. 
Blocks 18-21: These blocks ASSIGN the appropriate failure 
status to the transaction based on the probability of 
correct fault isolation. The 'probability value derived 
from the site. surveys is used in the TRANSFER statement and 
th-en all transactions move 'to Block 22 after ASSIGN\ment, 
Block 2 2 :  This block corresponds to the spares decision 
Block S5 of Figure 2 .  The probability value used in the 
TRANSFER statement was derived from the site survey. If 
there is no spare, the transaction TRANSFER'S to block 61. 
Otherwise, the transaction proceeds to the next block. 
Block 2 3 :  This block establishes the appropriate parameter 
value in Parameter 6 so that distinction can be easily made 
as to which on-line verification test position the trans- 
action is required to enter. 
  his particular block identi- 
fies Block S6 of Figure 2 as the correct on-line verifica- 
tion test position. In similar fashion program block 68 
identifies Block S7 of Figure 3 and program block 9 3  identi- 
fies Block. S8 of Figure 3. 
Block 2 4 :  This block establishes the QUEUE for all trans- 
- 
actions awaiting on--line verification testing. No trans- 
action can access th-e operating system while it is in a 
SEIZE'd status. This QUEUE provides a holding point as 
required and yields a total count of all attempts to use 
the on-line verification tests, Block 2 4  is also the 
critical system identification point representing the point 
of access of all returning transactions from the repair 
shop (-see Block 3 explanation). 
Block 2 5 :  This block represents one of the critical 
pp 
applications of the Parameter TRANSFER function. Variable 
Subfield C causes twenty units to he added to the value of 
Parameter 6. Theref ore, transacti.ons are sent to either 
block 26, 27, or 28 as necessary. 
Blocks 26-28: These are merely unconditional TRANSFER 
blocks to route the transaction to either test Block S6, 
S7, or S8 as required by the - transaction specification. 
The correct TRANSFER decision was actually made by block 
25. These combinations illustrate the power of applica- 
tion of the various modes associated with the TRANSFER 
statements. Transactions that have moved successively 
through the model now begin following diverse paths. Some 
transactions have already diverged from Block S5. Those 
entering Block S6 are now moved to program block 50 for 
continuation of the flow described by Figure 2. 
Blocks 29-31: These blocks form a small subroutine for 
holding transactions that failed to gain access to the 
operating system after returning from the repair shop. The 
Loop can only be entered after the transaction has 
attempted to enter Block S7 or S8 and failed. It then pro- 
vides a delay of ten clock units (block 30) before attempt- 
ing to enter the system again. Some transactions may 
RECYCLE many times before being able to access an UP status 
operating system. This loop is analogous to repaired 
material arriving at a point and waiting for periodic 
assessment by a technician as to whether the operating 
system is available for an on-line verification ch-eck. 
It does not affect the statistical values pertaining to 
the actual repair cycle, nor does it impact those statis- 
tics of the operating systea that are being evaluated. 
Blocks 3 2 - 4 9 :  These blocks establish the QUEUE'S, TEST'S, 
and delays associated with Blocks S7 and St3 of Figure 3 .  
It is part of the operating-system, but is applicable to 
the repair shop cycle only. In other words, no transaction 
can enter this loop without first entering Point I of the 
repair shop. Therefore, all transactions returning to 
this point must wait until the operating system is avail- 
able before a test can be attempted. In FLOWSIM, QUEUE'S 
may have names or numbers at the discretion of the progran- 
mer. Therefore, use is made of the QUEUE number method so 
that both Blocks S7 and S8 transactions can flow through 
the same subroutine while 'being separately enumerated. 
Block 32 adds forty units to the value of Parameter 6 so 
that Block S7 transacti.ons enter QUEUE 47 and Block St3 
transactions enter QUEUE 4 8 .  After passing through the 
loop, block 43  restores the original Parameter 6 values. 
Block 3 4  checks to see if the 'system is SEIZE' d. If it is, 
the transaction moves to block 38 for identification. If 
a transaction SEIZE'd the system at Block S1, had no spare 
at Block S5, then the 'system would be DOW awaiting repair. 
This returning transaction from the repair shop carries its 
original clock time at failure in Parameter 7. The trans- 
action originally downing the system had its clock time at 
failure stored in SAVEVALUE 5. These two values are now 
compared and then, if and only if they are equal, the 
transaction is granted immedZate access to the operating 
system at block 35. If they are not equal, some other 
transaction has the system domed and the current trans- 
action is RECYCLE1d to block 29, q.v., for a later check. 
In order to avoid disruption of the QUEUE nuinber now in 
Parameter 7, RECYCLEfd transactions, after being delayed 
by block 30, will unconditionally TRANSFER over block 32 
directly to block 33, retaining the correct Block S7 or S8 
. 
identification. 
If the system was UP (not SEIZE'd) when checked at 
block 34, the transaction will move to block 35, SEIZE the 
system, then move to block 36. Here the clock time becomes 
unimportant since the system was either restored by a spare 
'Block S6) or by the original DOWN1ing transaction, and 
Parameter 7 is set to the value "l", a value that cannot 
represent a failure time due to the specifications in the 
GENERATE statement. The transaction is now unconditionally 
TRATJSFER'ed to block 39 where all transactions gaining 
access to the operating system at either Block S7 or S8 
are delayed by the mean time for conducting the on-line 
verifications. The transactions are tested by block 40 
again using the Parameter 7 value against the SAVEVALUE. 
Those transactions having just SEIZETd the system at block 
' 35 will pass the NE (-not equal) logic and move to block 41 
to RELEASE the system. Those transactions failing the NE 
logic will J m P  to block 42 and eventually all transactions 
that entered this loop at--black 32 then move on to block 45. 
At block 45, the true failure status is checked with 
non-failures moving -to block 46, and then to block 143 for 
further processing. Failure transactions move to block 47 
where the correct test Block CS7 or S8)  is ascertained. 
Failures @O-GO'S) exiting Block S 7  must reenter the repair 
shop routine, therefore, these transactions move from pro- 
gram block 48 to block. 62. Failures (-NO-GO' s) exiting 
Block S 8  move to Point I1 of ~ i ~ u r e  3, so these transactions 
move from block 49 to block 142 for further processing. 
Blocks 50-60: Block 50 is the actual continuation point for 
the flow of transactions represented exclusively by Figure 
2, having arrived at this point from program block 26. The 
intervening blocks from 29--49 are merely a convenience loca- 
tion for the program functions that they perform and could 
have just as easily been placed between current blocks 60 
and 61 provided all pargmeter T P 4 S F E R  mode statements are 
properly adjusted. 
Block 50 provides the on-line verification time delay 
before the transaction moves to block 51. The mean time was 
derived from the site Surveys and is a cormnon value for 
Blocks S6, S7, and S8 for a 'given operating system. 
Th.e failure status is ascertained by block 51, sending 
non-.failures to block 52 and failures to block 53, A non- 
failure at this point in the flow reproduces the condition 
where a spare item does not verify the original malfunction 
during verification tests, - - -  Therefore, another failure 
must be looked for and the transaction cycles back to 
Block S2 at program block 10 via blocks 58-60. Block 58 
raises the priority level o f  the transaction for immediate 
processing. It is immaterial at this point for model pur- 
poses, how the spare is handled. That is, it could be left 
in the system and th.e originally pulled item sent to 
storage, or the spare returned to storage after re- 
installing the originally removed item, since either item 
is assumed to be good. No attempt was made at this time to 
model those conditions where the spare itself was defective 
when drawn from storage. Slight modifications to the pro- 
gram can do this, but it was not an objective of this model. 
Transactions arriving at block 53 and representing 
failed material must now perform two distinct functions. 
One function must be that of the original defective item 
moving to the repair shop, and the other represents the 
good spare that restores the system to UP status. This is 
accomplished at block 54 by the SPLIT operation which makes 
an identical copy of the original transaction including all 
the parameter specifications of the original. The original 
transaction now moves to block 55 while the copy goes to 
block 62, the repair shop entry point. 
Continuing from block 55, the system is WLEASE'd 
from the originating failure condition and the transaction 
moves out of the system from block 57 to block 151. 
Blocks 61-152 contain-$he repair shop routine and 
other "housekeeping" functions and essentially completes 
the simulation model. Any additional operating systems are 
added to the model beginning with block 153. Each corres- 
ponding operating system function can be 
152 to System 1's block numbers and then 
thereafter. For instance, the beginning 
statements, of each operating system are 
Operating System 
Operating System 
Operating System 
Operating System 
Operating System 
Operating System 
End of Model 
Blo 
Blo 
Blo 
Blo 
Blo 
Blo 
found by 
multiples 
s, or GENE 
found as 
adding 
of six 
RATE 
follows 
Block 453 and all following statements would be moved 
forward or backward as required by the number of operating 
systems located at the site being modeled. 
.Programming the Repair Shop Phase 
Repair Shop Program Block Functions 
(Blocks 61-105) 
Blocks 61-62: These blocks correspond to the entry Point I 
of the repair shop. Block 61 establishes the identifica- 
tion of that failed material coming in which had no avail- 
able spare and is therefore holding the system DOWN. These 
transactions and all other transactions then enter the 
repair shop flow via block 62 which establishes the common 
non-priority of all work entering the shop for the first 
time . 
Blocks 63-66: Block 63 ascertains the complexity level of 
the failed material which then processed, proba- 
bility basis, into the repalr shop at block 67 or out of 
the repair shop via block 142 CPoint 11). These blocks 
perform the function of Block R1 of Figure 3. 
Blocks 67-78: Transactions now enter the repair shop 
QUEUE labeled RETAIN at block 67. Parameter 6 is set to 
represent Block S7 and the transaction now enters the 
Performance Verification Subroutine (Block R2, point a) at 
block 69. The internal programming of this subroutine is 
explained in the next section. Items indicating that a 
failure is present by the Performance Verification Sub- 
routine (PVS) reenter the flow at block 73. Those items 
indicating non-failure reenter the flow at block 70, 
having exited Block R2, point c, and rust then move to 
Block S7 of the original operating system. This is accom- 
plished by block 72 which TRANSFER'S to the block number 
stored in Parameter 4. For System 1, this number is 
twenty- four. 
Transactions indicating failures by Block R2 and those 
that are given a higher priority returning from Block R3 
through Block R2 will continue in the program from block 
' 73 to block 74. Here they enter the Diagnostic Test Sub- 
Routine (DTS) and may be 'either passed to Point 11, or 
I 
show failure, or non-failure by the DTS. The internal 
programming of this subroutike is explained in a later 
section. Transactions showing non-failure reenter the 
flow at block 75, have their priority raised by blbck 76 
and TRANSFER1ed to block 69-for reprocessing in the PVS. 
Those transactions indicating failure by the DTS and those 
with higher priorities established elsewhere in the model 
reenter the flow at block 78 and continue to block 79. 
Blocks 79-80: These blocks are used to reestablish all 
- 
transactions coming from Block R2 as non-priority while 
maintaining the priority established for those returning 
from Block R5.  Block 79 does this by checking Parameter 6 
to determine which on-line verification Block, S7 or S8,  
is stored in the parameter field. 
Blocks 81-93: These blocks implement the requirements of 
Block R4 of Figure 3. The complexity level is assessed by 
block 82 and the transactions forwarded to the appropriate 
delay blocks by blocks 83-85. Blocks 86-90 represent the 
mean repair times for each complexity level which were 
derived from the site surveys. All transactions then 
arrive at block 91 which sets the failure status to "0". 
In this way, all transactions exiting the repair function 
block are presumed to be good. Block 93 then sets Para- 
meter 6 to the value "8" (Block S8) which would be the next 
on-line test position for all transactions leaving Block R4. 
Blocks 94-105: Block R5 of Figure 3 is implemented by pro- 
gram blocks 94-99 while b.locks 100- 105 represent those 
transactions still indicat-ing failure status by the PVS 
and must go back through Block R3. 
Transactions indicating ."no failurett by Block R5,  and 
those with higher priority -levels established elsewhere in 
the model, reenter the flow at block 95 and move to the 
on-line verification Block S8 via block 97. Transactions 
indicating "failure" by Block R5 reenter the flow at block 
98, are elevated in priority by block 99 and are cycled 
back to the DTS (Block R3) via block 100. Blocks 101-103 
are non-functional in this location since no transaction 
can exit Block this point the flow process. 
definition of the system requirements, priority transac- 
tions must always exit Block R3 at point b which corres- 
ponds to program block 104 here. Therefore, merely 
symmetry was maintained due to the DTS being called from 
two different locations, and by sending transactions back 
from the DTS using one logic function. Blocks 101-103 
could easily be replaced by ADVANCE 0 statements. So, 
all transactions exiting Block R3 from this program loca- 
tion reenter the flow at block 104 and move to the repair 
function (-Block R4) kt block 81 via block 105. 
Performance Verification Subroutine 
(Blocks 106-122) 
Whenever the statement TRANSFER SBR,PERFVER,3 is 
encountered, transactions are sent to the PVS section of 
the program. These program- blocks represent both Block R2 
and Block R5 of the Repair Shop flow and the correct flow 
position of the transaction is "remembered" by storing the 
program block number which called the subroutine in Para- 
meter 3 of the transaction. The subroutine is called from 
blocks 69 and 94 of the repair shop flow program. 
Transactions entering the PVS are checked for complex- 
ity level by block 107 and then TRANSFER1ed to the appro- 
priate test time delay block. ~hese mean test times for 
the complexity levels were derived from the site surveys. 
All PVS transactions later arrive at block 116 which TEST's 
for non-zero priority. Zero, or non-priority items, pro- 
ceed to block 117 (Subblock P2 of Figure 4). Priority 
items are sent directly to another TEST at block 120. 
Block 117 performs the requirements of-Subblock P2 by 
ascertaining the failure status and routing non-failure 
transactions to block 118 
transactions to block 117 
CSubblock P 4 )  and sending failure 
(Subblock P3) . At these blocks, 
the probability levels representing the PVS test accuracy 
causes non-failure indications to go to block 122 and 
failure indications to go to block -121 regardless of the 
true,failure condition which cannot be known by the opera- 
tors. 
Block 120 TEST's the non-zero priorities and separates 
Priority 1, sending them to block 121, from Priority 2 
transactions which go to block 122, This is the logic that 
implements the system operaking requirements that priority 
material must exit Block R2 at point b (block 121) while 
exiting Block R5 at point c (block 122), and at the same 
time route non-priority material to either exit based on 
preassigned probabilities operating on the actual failure 
status. 
Diagnostic Test Subroutine (Blocks 123-141) 
Whenever the statement TRANSFER SBR,DIAGNOST,3 is 
encountered, transactions are sent to the DTS section of 
the repair shop flow. Although this block CR3) is used in 
only one position in the repair shop flow, it is called 
from program blocks 74 and 100. This is done in order to 
maintain the tramaction flow sequence and to "remember" 
the flow position by storing the progran block number which 
called the subroutine in Parameter 3 of the transaction. 
In this way, Priority 1 material returning from Block R2 
and Priority 2 material returning from Block R5 are easily 
handled in the logic. 
Transactions entering the DTS are checked for complex- 
ity level by block 124 and then TRANSFER' ed to the appro- 
priate test time delay block. These mean test times were 
derived from the site surveys. All DTS transactions even- 
tually arrive at block 133 where the decision is made to 
keep the item and attempt repair or ship it to the depot 
or manufacturer (-Point I1 of Figure 3). This decision is 
based on the probability v.aLue derived from the site sur- 
veys and is a function of the test equipment capability. 
Those items shipped out leave the system model via block 
140. Those transactions continuing through the model from 
block 133 move to block 134 where they are TEST'ed for 
non-zero priority. All priority transactions are required 
to exit Block R3 at point b and this is accomplished at 
block 134 by sending non-zero priorities to block 138. 
Non-priority transactions continue to block 135 for failure 
status determination. 
Non-failure transactions move to block 136 (Subblock 
D5) while failure transactions nove to block 137 (-Subblock 
D4).  At these blocks, transactions are routed, on a 
probability basis, to block 135 if they indicate failure, 
and to block 139 if they indicate non-failure regardless 
of the true failure status. These blocks cause the trans- 
actions to TRANSFER back to the appropriate flow position 
in the model by examining Parameter 3. Therefore, blocks 
134-139 execute the logic required to send all non-priority 
transactions out of Block 83 via either points b or c based 
on failure status and failure indications, while always 
forcing priority transactions out via point b only. 
Miscellaneous Block Functions 
Blocks 142-147: Additional program steps are required to 
handle the transactions reaching Point I1 of Figure 3. 
These are required in orde-r-to provide model continuity and 
iqlement the assumption that a DOWN system must be returned 
to UP status at this point. All transactions reaching Point 
I1 are sent by the model to-block 142. At this time, two 
basic conditions exist: (1) either the transaction repre- 
sents a defective item which was replaced by a spare and 
the operating system is UP, or (2) the transaction repre- 
sents the actual failed item for which there was no spare, 
and the operating system is therefore DOWN. Recall that 
these decisions were made at Block S5 and implemented at 
program block 22. If there was no spare, the transaction 
went to block 61, and had Parameter 5 set to the value "1". 
It is only condition (2) which must be further processed. 
Condition (1) material is sent to block 151 via block 146 
by block 145 and essentially exits the model. 
Condition C2) material is now sent to block 147, by 
block 145, which checks Parameter 4 to find which operating 
system it came from. In the case of System 1, thirty-two 
units are added to the Parameter 4 value of twenty-four 
giving block 56 as the return point. Block 56 correctly 
RELEASE'S the system since no other transaction can be 
responsible for the DOUIV condition. The transaction now 
moves out of the system via block 57 to block 151. 
Blocks 145-150: These blocks implement that part of the 
model whereby a repaired item has indicated a G3 condition 
at Blocks S7 or S8 of Figure 3. Repaired material that 
now t e s t s  good s t i l l  h a s  -th-e-. two c o n d i t i o n s  exp la ined  i n  
t h e  s e c t i o n  above and,  t h e r e f o r e ,  r e q u i r e  a d d i t i o n a l  hand- 
l i n g  t o  r e s t o r e  t h e  DCiJtl sys tem.  Condi t ion  (1) m a t e r i a l  
i s  s e n t  t o  b lock  151  v i a  b lock  149 by b lock  148 and 
e s s e n t i a l l y  e x i t s  t h e  model. Condi t ion (2)  m a t e r i a l  i s  
s e n t  back t o  t h e  o r i g i n a l  o p e r a t i n g  system by b lock  150.  
A c t u a l l y  b locks  148-150 a re  i d e n t i c a l  t o  b locks  145-147, 
and a r e  n o t  n e c e s s a r y  i f  a d d i t i o n a l  s t a t i s t i c s  a r e  n o t  
needed by t h e  modeler .  Removing 'them, of c o u r s e ,  w i l l  
r e q u i r e  ad jus tments  i n  a l l  t h e  parameter  TRANSFER s t a t e m e n t s  
fo l lowing  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n  i n  the program. 
Blocks 151-152 and Block 453 : A l l  t r a n s a c t i o n s  GENERATE' d 
i n  t h e  model must be TEPtINATE'd a t  t h e  end of t h e i r  p a t h  
through t h e  model. The method of  t e r m i n a t i o n  i s  a t  t h e  
o p t i o n  of t h e  p r o g r a m e r  and depends on t h e  type  of sys tem 
be ing  modeled. Here,  t h e  sys tem o p e r a t e s  a g a i n s t  t h e  c l o c k  
and i s  TEWINATE'd a t  t h e  end of  each  c a l e n d a r  q u a r t e r  by 
t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n  r e a c h i n g  b l o c k  151  a f t e r  the s i m u l a t i o n  
cloclc r e a c h e s  131490, t h e  approximate number of minutes  i n  
a  q u a r t e r  y e a r .  This  i s  done by a  TEST a g a i n s t  t h e  c l o c k  
t i m e .  A l l  t r a n s a c t i o n s  less t h a n  o r  e q u a l  (LE) t o  the 
r e q u i r e d  c l o c k  v a l u e  move t o  b l o c k  152 and a r e  des t royed .  
That  one t r a n s a c t i o n  a r r i v i n g  a t  b l o c k  151  a f t e r  t h e  system 
c l o c k  exceeds t h e  s e t  v a l u e  w i l l  f a i l  t h e  l o g i c  t e s t  and 
move t o  b lock  453 where t h e  s i m u l a t i o n  r u n  i s  then s topped .  
More t h a n  one q u a r t e r  y e a r  of  s i m u l a t i o n  i s  accomplished 
by placing the appropriate-..combination of START and RESET 
controls a t  the end of the program. In t h i s  way, once the 
model i s  s t a r t ed ,  a l l  transactions w i l l  move through the 
system i n  a continuous fash2on while a s t a t i s t i c a l  posture 
of the model can be obtained fo r  the end of each quarter ,  
i n  essence a "picture" of the operation on a quarterly 
bas is .  These quarterly s ta tus  reports a re  contained i n  
the Appendices. 
IV. FODEL RESULTS 
The simulation model Gas exercised to produce four 
quarterly outputs for each simulation year. Several out- 
put formats are available to the programer, but typical 
standard results include Block Counts, Facility Statistics 
and Queue Statistics. These simulation model outputs 
appear in Appendices B through D'. 
The Block Counts provided in ~ppendix B allow the 
programmer to determine how many transactions pass through 
any given program block in the period of interest. In this 
way, a useful method is available to measure work load 
(-quantitatively) at any point in the work flow. The pro- 
gram block numbers are sequential, corresponding directly 
to the program listing in Appendix A. Where the Location 
Field has been labeled, the label name appears in lieu of 
the block number. This facilitates rapid identification 
and visibility of important work flow points. For example, 
during the first quarter of simulation, 149 transactions 
representing failed items for which there was no spare 
available entered the repair shop via the LOCOFF block. 
Sequentially, this is block number 61. Referring to 
Appendix A shows that this program block adjusts Parameter 
5 of the transaction to establish the necessary decision 
criterion for later use in the model flow (blocks 145 and 
At the top lefthand corner of the first page of each 
quarterly output in Appendix are the terms "Relative 
Clock Time" and "Absolute C-lock Time". The Relative Clock 
keeps track of each simulation period and provides the 
quarterly cue to produce the periodic "picture", or status, 
without disturbing the simulation run. This action is 
controlled by the START 1,,1 and RESET statements at the 
end of the program listing. After the third RESET, the 
program encounters only the START 1 and then the END state- 
ments. In essence, this is the quarterly simulation con- 
trol and the Absolute Clock yields the cumulative time 
since the beginning of the simulation run. This effective- 
ly labels the quarter by observing the Absolute Clock to 
the nearest whole multiple of the Relative Clock Time, 
i . e . , one, two, three, or four. 
Appendix C provides the facility utilization statis- 
tics which in this model are used to determine the opera- 
ting systems' availability. Utilization normally measures 
the percentage of system seizure, or service time in 
queueing systems. However, a most important function used 
to measure an operating system's performance is its availa- 
bility,. or percentage of UP time Cnon-seized by a failure) . 
Therefore; 
SYSTEM AVAILABILI.TY = 1 - FACILITY UTILIZATION 
In addition, the "Number Entries" column reveals how many 
times the system was seizeddue to failures and on-line 
verification tests. The "Average Time/TransW column shows 
the mean down time in minutes- per seizure. The remaining 
columns are unimportant to -this model. 
Appendix D contains the Queue Statistics for the model 
and shows how many transactions passed through designated 
measuring points in the model. The "Queue ID" column lists 
the labeled Queues as well as the numbered (unlabeled) 
Queues. queues three through six are associated with the 
repair shop and Queues 47 through 98 relate to the On-Line 
Verification Blocks S7 and S8 of each operating systen. 
They are associated in pairs; 47 and 48 relate to Blocks 
S7 and S8 of System 1, 57 and 58 to System 2, etc. Import- 
ant columns in this output format are the "Total Entries1', 
and the "NZ-Average Time/TransW which yields the average 
delay time for passing through certain portions of the 
model. Proper placement of the QUEUE/DEPART set will allow 
delay measurements anywhere in the flow. As an example, 
the queue, REPAIR, reveals that there were ninety-five 
entries into Block R4 of Figure 3 during the first quarter 
simulation. The average transit time through Block R 4  
for these ninety-five transactions was 26.653 minutes. The 
QUEUE begins in program block 81 and DEPART'S at program 
block 92. However, the queue PERFVER is a little more 
complicated due to several decision variables in the model. 
This QUEUE indicates that Blocks R2 and R5, combined, 
serviced 255 transactions --wieh the average transit time 
through the Figure 4 block being87.322 minutes. An easy 
deduction by looking at Figure 3 would be that 95 of those 
255 transactions entered the Block R5 portion of the flow, 
leaving 160 entering at Block R2.  This can be verified by 
looking at program block 69, labeled SECOND, which repre- 
sents the entry point of Block R2. In Appendix B, the 
block labeled SECOND (-69) shows 160 entries for the first 
quarter, which checks with. the abbve deduction. In this 
manner, the programmer is able to efficiently label and read 
important decision points in the model for rapid retrieval 
of needed data. 
Appendices B through D then represent the baseline 
model output statistics as defined by the site surveys and 
historical data inputs. The model contains .several impor- 
tant decision parameters which were subsequently varied 
to observe system sensitivity, response, and work load 
changes. Among the most important variables exercised were: 
(1) Self-test Accuracy represented by Block S3 of Figure 2, 
(2) Spares Level Probability represented by Block S5 of 
Figure 2, (-3) Performanc'e Verification Accuracy represented 
by Blocks R2 and R5 of Figure 3 and implemented at Sub- 
blocks P3 and P4 of Figure 4, and (4 )  Diagnostic Test 
Accuracy represented by Block R3 of Figure 3, and imple- 
mented by Subblocks D4 and D5 of Figure 5. 
The actual computer outputs of these variations will 
not be included in this report due to the sheer volume of 
the data, but the pertinent results are summarized in the 
following sections. 
- 
BIT or Self-Test Accuracy 
This variable essentially determines the probability 
of correctly pulling the original failed material. Its 
impact on the system should be reflected in the percentage 
of recycled non-failures from Block S6 to Block S2 and in 
addition, there should be an impact on the repair shop due 
to non-failed items exiting to Point I from Block S5. With 
more recycles and check-outs of non-failed items, it would 
be expected that system availability should drop with a 
drop in self-test accuracy. 
The statistically random failure rate is also driving 
the system response which can be seen by the quarterly 
deviations in the base line data. So an important finding 
will also be whether changes in decision variables create 
any perceptive deviation from the random baseline patterns. 
Generally speaking, lower failure rate systems have higher 
availabilities, but this parameter is also impacted by 
delay times within the system for repair and tests. In 
order to help overcome the random failure deviations, the 
availability of each system for all four quarters was 
averaged and then used for comparison with the resulting 
variations caused by changes in the decision variable. 
Table I presents the impact on system availabilities due 
to varying the self-test accuracy. 
The Baseline values for the operating systems- were 
generally different, depending on each specific design. 
Theywere: (1) 99, (2)-(4) 93, (5) 70, and (6) 96 percent 
for Systems 1-6 respectively. In order of the programmed 
failure rates, the operating systems can be loosely cate- 
gorized as low, medium and high failure rate sys terns. In 
general, System 4 and System 5 are low failure rate, with 
System 3 high. System 1 is on the high side of a low 
failure rate system. These categorizations are relative 
to each other but show interesting groupings when observ- 
ing responses to parameter variations. 
Table I shows a general positive correlation of all 
systems when the self-test is improved. Note that Systems 
1, 4, and 5 are least responsive (small coefficients of X) 
and Systems 2 and 6 are most responsive. 
Another index. reflecting system response is the Total 
System Maintenance Time (TSbIl') . These values can be 
extracted from Appendix C data by: 
TSMT = ~(.Humber Entries x Ave. TimeITrans) 
This index reflects the total down tine encountered by the 
operating systems due to 1 )  failures, and (2) on-line 
verification tests. More false alarms will reflect a 
general increase in work levels throughout the model with 
the associated increase in total down times of the opera- 

65 
b 
ting systems. The average-self-test accuracy of the base- 
line systems is ninety percent. The TSMT of this data is 
265,059.9 minutes. Table 2 shows the change associated 
with self-test accuracy. 
TABLE 2 
Total System Maintenance Time 
Changes due to Self-Test Accuracy 
The actual change from the baseline to the eighty per- 
t 
cent level is a little less than 57'6 man hours, or just over 
SELF-TEST ACCURACY (%) TSMT (MIN. ) % INCPEASE 
one-quarter standard man year. 
Note that this is direct active labor and does not 
BASELINE 
85 
80 
reflect the actua1,manloading due to administrative, paper- 
work, safety, and other allied duties. These latter acti- 
vities can often quadruple the direct labor load. This 
manloading will then need to be evaluated against the costs 
265,059.90 
279,177.73 
'299,609.18 
of designing self-test accuracy into the operating systems 
to ascertain true benefits. 
- 
. 5.33 
13.03 
Another decision variable that was not manipulated 
during the basic research was associated with Block R1 of 
Figure 3. For the baseline data, this variable actually 
allowea approximately one_third of the total failures into 
the repair shop. This decision variable depends heavily 
upon maintenance policy as to. what repair level capability 
will be implemented in a particular repair facility. The 
remaining failures were assumed to be processed to more 
sophisticated facilities and the systems restored. The 
subsequent impact on workload levels in the repair shop is 
then shown in Table 3. This table shows the increasing 
workloads as Self-test accuracy decreases. 
TABLE 3 
Repair Shop Workload Changes 
Due to Self-Test Accuracy 
SELF-TEST ACCURACY (%) 
t :  
PERFORMANCE TEST DIAGNOSTIC TEST 
r 
In addition to these results, the percentage of 
. . 
Baseline 
- 
recycled, or "second-looks" for the original failure ranged 
from 8.2 percent for System 4 to 32.9 percent for System 6 
1124 584 T*& 
*+ P C ' * ~ ~  
when the accuracy level was eighty percent. At the ninety 
'percent level, these recycles dropped to 6.1 percent for 
System 4 and..9.9 percent for System 6 as measured against 
the initial number of failure alerts. 
difference total expended tine between the 
baseline and eighty percent accuracy level for the Table 3 
quantities processed was about 102 nan hours for the 
Performance Tests and about forty man hours for the 
Diagnostic Tests. Coupled with the systems time yields 
about 718 man hours of extra direct labor. 
Spares Level Probability 
The anticipated impact of lower spares levels would be 
reflected in a larger quantity of failed items going into 
the repair shop without replacement spares and theref ore, 
expected longer system down times. This would apparently 
result in lower system availabilities. The baseline 
percent values for the systems varied widely as follows: 
System 1 - 80, System 2 - 60, System 3 - 50, System 4 - 40, 
System 5 - 75, System 6 - 94. From the baseline, the - 
spares probability level was uniformly set for all systems 
at 75, 80, 85, and 90 percent respectively. The impact on 
systems availability is shown in Table 4. 
The resulting impact on operating system availability 
sho~m by Table 4 was somewhat unexpected. There is little 
response to changes in the spares probability as shown by 
the small coefficient of X in the regression equations and 
in fact some systems even displayed a negative response. 
Further thought will recall that the random failure pattern 

is independent of the spares-supply and appears to be a 
much stronger driver of availability, at least over the 
spares range examined. It is-recognized that in a' finite 
spare supply, these same results would not be obtained due 
to discontinuities caused by periodic running out of spares. 
., 
No significant changes in the work load was found at 
any point in the repair shop. This is a logical conclusion 
since the repair shop will process at least one failed 
item for each system failure regardless of the spares 
situation. In fact, one of the few items of interest found 
with this variable was the quantity of failed itens enter- 
ing the repair shop via the LOCOFF block, that is, no spare 
available. This is shown in Table 5. 
TABLE 5 
Failures Entering Repair Shop 
Mith No Spares 
The anticipated longer systea do-wn times are reflec- 
SPARES LEVEL (%) QUAIIT1 TY - % iIECXEASE 
ted in the TSNT shown by Table 6 .  
75 
. 80 
85 
90 
r 
473 
416 
300 
204 
- 
12.05 
36.58 
56.76  
Total System Maintenance Time 
Changes due to- Spares Level 
SPARES LEVEL ( - X )  1 BASELINE (AVE - 67) 
Here again, the system randomness seems to be the more 
powerful influence with less than a one percent savings in 
manpower (.about 31 man hours) from the baseline level to 
the ninety percent level of sparing. 
Performance Verification Accuracy 
The Performance Verification Test is basically a GO, 
NO GO decision test with the intent to make rapid, gross 
level decisions. The baseline data operated on a 70130 
decision capability, That is, failed material was properly 
detected 70 percent of the time and good material was 
claimed.to be bad 30 percent of the time. Other levels 
tested were 80120 and 90/10. It was not known whether this 
parameter would be significant since failed material would 
arrive at the repair shop with a probability of being 
truly defective essentiallycontrolled by the self-test 
accuracy. However, it could be expected that lower detec- 
tion levels by the performance test should cause more 
on-line tests and subsequently lower system availabilities. 
The results of the exercise are shown in Table 7. 
Varying this parameter results in a consistent response 
by all operating systems, however, first impression is that 
it is in the wrong direction. This variable is a prime 
candidate for further study, which is beyond the scope of 
this model exercise. 
Due to the random failure .pattern, there were 7.24 
percent more failures during the 90/10 exercise year than 
experienced by the model for the 70130 exercise year. This 
resulted in 5.22 percent more items being processed through 
the PVS block and could be the major cause of the negative 
response directions of the operating systems. Here agaen, 
it appears that the 'systems are more sensitive to the ran- 
dom failure pattern than they are to the range of deviations 
exercised in the model for the PVS variable. 
The impact on manloading throughout the repair shop 
due to varying the Performance Test accuracy is shown in 
Table 8. 
The total manloading increase for all three areas is 
partly attributable to the 7.24 percent increase in failures 
during the 90/10 simulation run. However, the DTS man- 
loading increased by 10.79 percent which is partially 
TABLE 7 
Average Systems Availability Changes 
due to PVS Accuracy 
PERFORIiANCE ACCURICY (%) - 7013.0 80/2.0 90110. REGRESSION CORR. . . . . .  . . . . .  EQUATIOIV ' R% 
I .  I I t 
System 1 
System 2 . 
System3 
System 4 
. . . .  945. . . .  948 . . . . .  .94.2. . . . .  
- . . . .  . . . . .  . 88.2. , . ..8.82. 8.7.4 
System 5 
TABLE 8 
.878 .876 . 8.69. . . . .  
.979 . 978 . . . .  .9.8.4 . . . . . .  . 
System 6 
Repair Shop Maintenance Time 
Changes due to PVS Accuracy 
. *  i.9.5.7 .-. .0.15.~ 
.9 10 . , .9 14. . . . .  .9.1.0. . . . . . . . .  
PERFOHUNCE ACCURACY (%) PVS T'IME (MIN . ) DTS TIME (MIN . )  ' ' REPAIR TIME (MINS . ) 
I I I 
. 25 .00 
.. .9.1,0 . - .  045x 
. ..99.7 .-. . ..0.25.x 
.902 .901 ,398 . . 
90.67 
. 89  . 28 
.9.1.1 + .o.o.o~ 
..916 - .020x 
90110 . I . . , .  1.08.,3.9.9.. 2 10
0 1 ' I  
92.30 
. . . . . .  4.6.,.3.1.6. J4.2
b 
. . . . . . . . .  13,241.392 
73 
accounted f o r  by the change i n  PVS accuracy. In teres t ing-  
_. - -- 
l y ,  the Repair manloading increased by exactly 7.25 percent 
which simply implies t h a t  eventually f a i l e d  mater ia l  would 
be properly detected and subsequently - repaired.  
Diagnostic Test Accuracy 
The Diagnostic Test i s  the  most i n t r i c a t e  trouble- 
shooting procedure used i n  most r epa i r  f a c i l i t i e s .  I t s  
purpose i s  t o  spec i f i ca l ly  i s o l a t e  the exact f a i l e d  com- 
ponent on a module, pr inted c i r c u i t  board, or  other assem- 
bly entering the repa i r  shop. The baseline data was 
exercised a t  a 95/5 l eve l ,  t ha t  i s ,  the f a i l e d  pa r t  would 
be properly i so la ted  ninety-f ive  percent of the  time and 
improperly denoted f i ve  percent of the time. The impact on 
system performance i s  shorn i n  Table 9 .  
A s  previously noted, Systems 1 ,  4 ,  and 5 a r e  the  lower 
f a i l u r e  r a t e  systems. These a r e  showing the most s e n s i t i -  
v i t y  t o  the diagnostic accuracy. While system avai la -  
b i l i t i e s  show general pos i t ive  response (except f o r  System 
6) the ac tua l  changes a re  qu i t e  small. 
The impact on manloading i n  the r epa i r  shop i s  shown 
i n  Table '10. 
Manloading generally decreases i n  the  repa i r  shop a t  
a l l  points  as a r e s u l t  of increased diagnostic accuracy. 
Manpower savings a r e  10.37 percent a t  the PVS, 16.93 percent 
a t  the DTS which i s  almost uniformly r e l a t ed  to  the f i f t een  

75 
percent change in the variaue, and five percent in the 
- - 
actual Repair activity. 
At the 80120 accuracy level, the total repair-shop nan- 
loading is equivalent to 1.&3 standard man-years of active, 
continuous effort. However, this in no way reflects the 
fact that many simultaneous efforts must be taking place, 
including removal and delivery of the failed material to 
the repair shop, administrative effort including paperwork 
and reports, and various other actions relating to the safe- 
ty and general housekeeping. At the 95/05 level of accuracy, 
4 
this direct labor reduces to about 1.26 standard man-years. 
The actual reduction is approximately 11.56 percent. Since 
these latter mentioned duties can easily quadruple the 
direct labor hours, it appears that the diagnostic accuracy 
level becomes an important variable to consider in future 
maintenance support concepts. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This research project presents the development of a 
simulation model which was used in the production of 
statistical data for use in analyzing the impact of deci- 
sion parameter changes on system performance and workloads 
at a Navy field site. 
The collection of data and formulation of a work flow 
structure to represent a Navy field site consisting of a 
repair shop in support of several operating systems was 
accomplished and is represented by Figures 1 through 5. 
The survey data was reduced to provide significant data 
elements representing branching decisions, delay times and 
failure rates in the flow diagram. 
Detailed operating instructions applicable to the work 
flow were developed and basic assumptions established for 
the simulation model. This was followed by specific pro- 
graming instructions to formulate the computer based simu- 
lation model and application programming techniques 
resolve the actual work flow requirements. The model was 
then run utilizing the TRACE capabilities for debugging. 
Data output from the model was compared to historical 
information to verify correct operations. For example, the 
total failures represented by the baseline simulation run 
for one year was 2129. Thig -. - compares with the historical 
data of 2239, a difference of only about five percent. 
The decision parameters that were exercised in the 
model were; (1) Built-in-Tes t (.BIT) or self- tes t accuracy, 
(2) probability of having spare parts, (3) performance test 
accuracy, and (4) diagnostic test accuracy. Each of these 
parameters represent some form of maintenance support that 
might be altered due to the introduction of ATE into a Navy 
repair facility in support of training equipment. A set of 
statistical data similar to Appendices C and D was obtained 
for each change in the decision variables. These data were 
analyzed by various statistical methods and presented in 
Tables 1-10. 
While specific systems tended to respond in accordance 
with their inherent failure rate, some general conclusions 
may be drawn by summarizing the regression equations of 
each system against the decision variable. This informa- 
tion is show in Table 11. 
TABLE 11 
Average Response by Decision Variable 
- VARIABLE AVERAGE RESPONSE: RANGE OF X 1 
Performance 
-- 
~iagnostic 
.80 - .90 
-67 - .90 
Self -Tes t 
Spares Level 
3 2 2  + .105x 
.910 + .006x 
.934 - .024x 
3 9 3  + .022x 
.70 - .90 
- 8 0  - .95 
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Table 11 indicates tha-t Self-Test Accuracy is more 
_ _ _  _--.- 
influential where system availability is concerned. It 
should be noted from Table 1, and from the analyses in 
Appendices F and G, that high failure rate systems are 
more responsive to this variable which should lead to a 
trade-off or optimization study between inherent failure 
rates and self-test proficiency. 
The poor response of the Performance Test Accuracy 
may be partially due to the * spedif ic failure experience 
I, 
during the simulation runs. It would, however, indicate an 
inability to make a major contribution to system availa- 
bility arid is easily overpowered by the failure rate of 
the system. Even observing the change from the seventy 
percent level to the 'eighty percent level in Table 7 shows 
insignificant changes. in the individual system availabili- 
ties except for maybe System 5. 
Workload levels are summarized over specific variable 
4 
ranges in Table 12. The variable and its range .are denoted 
in the first column .while 'the percent change in maintenance 
time s are recorded column two .< These maintenance times 
represent time expended at the operating system for the 
,Self-Test and Spares variables and changes in the repair 
shop for the Performance and Diagnostic variables. The 
last column-indicates a rate of change of maintenance time 
per unit change in the .decision variable in order to 
observe the maximum contributor to labor changes. The 
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actual direct manpower for the baseline model is 2.12 man- 
years for the operating systems plus 1.26 for the repair 
shop. Collateral duties can easily quadruple this value- 
Labor Variation due to Gecision Variable Change 
Table 12 shows the Self-Test parameter to also have 
VARIABLE / RANGE LAB03 CHANGE RATE OF CHAiJGE 
the most impact on workloads or time expended as a result 
of failure alerts. These summarizations then show that, of 
SELF-TEST/. 80-. 90 
SPARES/.80-.90 
PERFORMANCE/. 79-. 80 
DIAGNOSTIC/.80--95 
the decision variables exercised, the Self-Test Accuracy 
is the most important in terms of impact on system perform- 
ance and resulting workloads. It should be noted that the 
results presented in this study represent only the four 
-11.53% 
- 1.45% 
- 5.10% 
-11.56% 
quarterly variations for each decision variable value. 
a complete statistical significance analysis were to be 
developed concerning the out~ut of data, several replica- 
tions of the model runs would be required with possible 
changes in the seed, or random variable generator, for each 
replication. However, the summaries presented herein do 
lead to the appropriate conclusions concerning which 
1.15 
0.15 
0.51 
0.77 
i 
.-- 
. '. 
, - ' - -F 
!T- 
variables are most sensitive and which systems are nost 
.__.-  
responsive to decision variable changes. The actual cost 
trade-offs between equipment design and personnel salaries 
would then have to be evaluated by the.design and logis- 
- 
tics teams in order to ascertain optimum benefits. 
APPENDIX A 
PICOGMI LISTING 
REPAIR !l'"-LOW M O D E L  
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WORK FLOW MODEL FOR A REPAIR Sl-1OP UITK SEVERAL INPUT SOURCES 
* J A M S  T, NEMELL PRQJECT PAPER 
REALLOCATE 200K 
00001 GENERATE 2400,FN%EXPDN, 5,  , ,7, F Sl 
00002 ADVANCE O 
00003 ASSIGN 4,24--  SYSTEH EtLOCK S,DI 
00004 SYSTEM1 QUEUE SYSTEM1 2FC7F 
00002; GATE NU SYSTEHI 
0000b S E I Z E  SYSTEMI 
OQ007 tifAkf.( 7 
00008 SAVEVALUE 5, P7, F 
00009 DEPART SYSTEM 
00010 REENTER TRANSFER .210,OTHER1, HICOHF' 
00011 UTHER1 TRANSFER .60C, LUCOHP, MEGORP 
00012 LOCUPfF ASSIGN 1 9 1  . LO COHftEXITY I ,D,CS2)  
00013 TRANSFER ,SELFTEST 
00014 MECOW ASSIGN 1,2 MED CQHftEXITY I,D,(S2) 
00015 TRANSFER ,SELFTEST 
00016 HICUHP ASSIGN 1,3 M I  CQHPLEXTTY 1, D, tS2) 
00017 SELFTEST ADVANCE 60,12 S3 
00018 TRANSFER .?90,NDNFAfL,FAfLUF:E 
00019 MDNITAf L ASSIGN 2,O NONFAfLURE TmDmCS4) 
00020 TRANSFER , SPARE 
00021 FAILURE ASSIGN 2,1 FAILUFiE J . D , t S 4 )  
00022 SFARE TRANSFER -200, VERIFY, LOCOFF S5 
00023 VERIFY ASSIGN 4 6  ONLI ME TESTBLOCK I. B, 
00024 OMtZbiE QUEUE ONLf HE 
00025 TRANSFER P, 6,20 
00026 TRANSFER ,CONTINUE 
00027 TRANSFEF; , CNECKDN 
00028 TRANSFER ,CHECKON 
00029 RECYCLE DEPART FA 
00030 ADVANCE 10 
00031 TRANSFER ,WAITING 
00032 CWECf(ON ASSIGM 6+, 40 
00033 MAITTNG QUEUE F'& 
00034 GATE NU SYSTEM, CUHPARE 
00035 SEIZE S Y S T E M  
0003b ASSIGN . ?,I 
00037 TRANSFER ,ADVANCE 
00038 COHPAF:E TEST E XS, P7, RECYCLE 
00038 ADVANCE ADVANCE 30,b 
000.40 TEST NE XS9P7? JUHP 
00041, . RELEASE SYSTEM 
00042 JURP DEPART P 1  
00043 ASS1 EM ti-, 40 
0 0 0 4 4  DEPART ONLINE 
00045 TRANSFER P1 2,4L 
00046 TKANSf ER , KFI 
00047 TRANSFER P , 6 , 4 1  
BLOCK XFER MUkiEEH 
BLOCK XFER NUHREF: 
REPAIR F L O W  NBDCL 
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000.48 TRANSFER ,OFFLINE 
00048 TRANSFER ,MASTOFF , 
00060 CONTINUE ADVANCE 30,6 
00051 TRANSFER P,2,5-2 
00052 TRANSFER ,RETEST 
00053 ADVANCE 0 - 
00054 UPSTAT1 SPLIT 1, QFFLINE 
0001;5 DEPART ONLI NE 
0005t F{ELEAGE SYSTEM 
00057 TRANSFER , CHECK 
00058 RETEST PRIORITY 1 
00058 DEPART ONLINE 
00010 TRANSFER , REENTER 
W ~ A R T  OF REPAIR SHOP SUBROUTINE 
000451 LOCOFF ASSIGN 5,1 a 
00012 OFFLINK PRIORITY 0 
000L3 TRANSFER P, 1,63 EfLOCE XFER NUHECF: 
000L4 TRANSFER . 750, RETAIN, MASTOFF R1 
00f)bE; TRANSFER .SOO,HETAIN,MASTOTF R l  
O O Q l l  TRANSFER .250, RETAIN, HASTOIT Ri 
00067 RETAIN WEUC RETAIN 
OOObE ASSIGN 6 ~ 7  
0006Y SECOND TRANSKF' SBR, PERFVEF;, 3 
00070 DEPART PERFVEH 
DEF'ART 
TRANSFER 
DEPART 
TRANSFER 
DEPART 
PRIORITY 
TRANSFER 
DEPART 
TRANSFER 
PRIORITY 
QUEUE 
TRANSFER 
TRANSFER 
TRANSFER 
TRANSFER . 
ADVANCE 
TRANSFER 
ADVANCE 
TRANSFER 
ADVANCE 
ASSIGN 
DEPART 
ASSIGN 
TRANSFER 
DEF'ART 
DEPART 
RETAIN 
r * 4  
PERFVER 
SBR, DI AGNOST, 3 
DIAGNOST 
1 
, SECOND 
DIRENOST 
F, 1,73 
0 
REPAIR 
P,1,82 
,FIX1 
, FIX2 
, FIX3 
22,5 
, TAG4 
32,6 
, TAG4 
32,b 
2,o 
REPAIR 
6 , 8  
SBR, PERFVtR, 3 
PERFVER 
RETAIN 
OFFLINE ROUTINE 
BLOCK XFEK NUt;iBER 
R4 ELOCG XFEF; NO, 
ONLINE TESTBLOCK I, D. 
R5 
PEF3Y3RH. VCRIF. KOUT. 
P i  BLOCK XFER NUREEK 
REPAIR F L O W  8-3ODf-L 
___---   
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00097 TRAfdSFER *4 $ 
000\?ilE3 DEPART PERFVER 
000Yf;S PRIORITY 2 
00100 TRANSFER SEE, ?-IAGNOST, 3 
00101 DEPART DIAGN_OST 
00102 DEPART Rf TAIN 
00103 TRANSFER , CHECK 
00104 DEPART D I  AGNOST 
00105 TKAMSFEF< , REPAIR 
00106 FEAFVER QUEUE IC'EWFVER 
00107 TRANSFER P, 1,107 
0010E TRANSFER ,DELAY1 
00l.09 TRANSFER , DELAY2 
00110 TKANSFER , DELAY3 
00111 DELAY1 ADVANCE 60,6 
00112 TRANSFER , TAG2 
00113 DELAY2 ADVANCE 103,21 
00114 TRANSFER , TAG2 
00115 DELAY3 ADVANCE 112,32 
0011h TAG2 TEST E PF:, 0, TAG1 
00117 TRANSFEF< P,2,11D P2 BLOCK XFER MUtiDEF; 
00118 E{RAN1 TRANSFER .700,BF:ANCKE,BRANCHC P4 
00119 BRAN2 TRANSFER .300,BRANCHB,BRANCKC P3 
00120 TAG1 TEST E PRY 1, URANCKC 
00121 BRANCHE TRANSFER F, 3,4 ~FRTOF<ITIES 011 1 
00122 WRANCKC TRANSFER P, 3,1 ~fRTORITfES 012) 
00123 DIAGN05T QUEUE DIAGNaST DIAGNOSTIC ROUTINE 
00124 TKANCf ER P, 1,124 D l  BLOCK XFER NUfiBER 
00125 TRANSFER , WOF'K1 
00121 TRANSFER ,WORK2 
00127 TRANSFER , WORK3 
00126 tJQf;f.(i ADVANCE 47,9 
00125' TRANSFER , T AG3 
00130 WORK2 ADVANCE 8P,13 
00131 TRANSFER , TAG3 
00132 bJQr:fs(3 ADVANCE 103,21 
00133 TAG3 TRANSFER -200, KETAINE, ROUTED D2 
00134 KETAINC TEST E PRY 0, RDUTEB 
00139 TRANSTER . P, 2,131 03 BLOCK XFER NUHBER 
00136 TRANSFER .?50, ROUTEB, ROUT EC Dt; 
00137 TRANSFER .OSO, ROUTEU, ROUTEC D4 
00136 ROUTED TRANSFER P, 3,4 ~PF~IOr<ITIES Q/1/2) 
00 139 ROUTEC TRANSFER P, 3 , l  t PRIOF<ITY 0 ) 
00140 ROUTED DCPAr<T DIAGNOST 
00141 DEPART RETAIftt 
*END Of: REPAIR SHOP SUBr;fJUTINE 
00142 PfASTOrF PF<IOr<IfY 0 SHIP BACI-< TO tSFG, 
00143 QUEUE t?RSTOFF 
+ASSUHC REPLACEMENT PART OBTAINED FOR THIS fiODCL PURPOSE 
00144 DEPART HASTOFF 
RCCY CL2 
ELDCK XFEf: bMt)ffrELK 
BLOCK XFER NUKBfR 
BLOCK XFfR NUPiBCR 
REPAIR F L O W  NODGL 
- -  . 
-- .- 
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00145 . TRANSFER PV5,141 BlQCK XECR NUtfDCR 
0014l TRANSFER ,CHECK 
00 147 TRANSFER P, 4,32 
00148 TRANSFER Py5,i47' 
00947 TRANSFER , CI.ICC_K 
00150 TRANSFER P, 4,32 
00151 TEST LE C1,1314?0, OFF 
00 152 TERHINATE 0 
00153 GENERATE 13C0, FNCEXPON, S t , ,  7, F 
00154 ADVANCE 0 
00155 ASSIGN 4,17L 
00151 QUEUE SY STEH2 
00157 GATE NU SYSTEM 
00158 SEIZE SYSTEB2 
0015P HAFfM 7 
00lLO SAVE VALUE 6, P7, F 
00111 DEf ART SY STEW 
00182 REENTER2 TRANSFER .030,OTt:ER2, NICOfi2 
00163 OTHER2 TRANSFER .165,LOCOtiZ,MECOMZ 
00164 LOCDH2 ASSIGN 
001L5 
1,i 
TRANSFER ,SELFTES2 
00111 ASSIGN 1,2 
00167 TRANSFER , SELFTES2 
001bG HICDff2 ASSIGN 1 ~ 3  MI COHfLEXTTY I-D, (S2) 
OOlbY SfLFIESZ ADVANCE 115,23 S3 
00170 TRANSFER .900, NOTAIL2, FAIL2 
00172 NOFAILZ ASSIGN 2,O 
00172 TRANSFER , SPAR2 
00173 ASSIGN 2 , i  FAILURE ImD.tS41 
00174 TRANSFER .400, VEHIF2, LOCOTF 55 
00175 ASSIGN 6,6 ONLINE TESTELOCK 3-  0. 
00171 QUEUE ONLIH2 
00177 TRANSFER P,1,172 
00178 TRANSFER , CONTIN2 
00178 TRANSFER ,CHCCKO2 
00180 TRANSFER ,CHECK02 
00i81. DEPART F1 
00182 ADVANCE 10 
00183 TRANSFER. ,WAITIN2 
00184 ASSIGN ti*+, 50 
00185 Q K D C  P1 
0018~ GATE NU SY ST EH2, COHf AR2 
00187' SEIZE SYSTEH2 
0018E ASSIGN 
00185' 
7 , i  
TRANSFER ,ADVANC2 
00190 COHf'AR2 TEST E X6, P?, KECY EL2 
00191 ADVANC2 ADVANCE 30,1 
00192 TEST NE XL,P7, JUMP2 
001'33 RELEASE SY STEW 
00 194 DEPART Pt 
SYSTEff BLOCK 1-D. 
21-87~ 
ONLINE VCRTFY 57 - SE 

BLOCK XFEi? NUHBER 
WAITfM3 WCUC F1  ONLINE VERIFY S7 - SC 
GATE NU SYSTEi93, COMf A83 
SEIZE SYSTEM3 . 
ASSIGN 7 , i  - 
TRANSFER , A D U A B C ~  
CORFAR3 TEST E X7, Y7,RCCYCL3 
ADVANC3 ADVANCE 30,6 
TEST NC X?,P7,JUMP3 
RLLEASE SYSTEH3 
JUt.5F3 DEPART PL 
ASSIGN 6 - ,  60 
DEFAF<T ONLIN3 
TFaNSFER P, 2,2EIE 
TRANSFER ?RrI 
TRANSFER Y, 1,253 
TRANSFER fDFFLINE 
TRANSFER , MASTOTF 
CONTIN3 ADVANCE 30,b 
TRANSFER PP2,2L4 
TRANSFER ,HETES3 
ADVANCE 0 
UPSTAT3 SPLIT 1, OTFLINE 
DEPART OMLIN3 
RELEASE SYSTEH3 
TRANSFER , CHECK 
RETES3 Pi:IOF(TTY I 
DEPART ONLIN3 
TRANSFER ,REENTER3 
GENERATE 5C80, FNf EXPON, 5,, ,7, F Sl 
ADVANCE 0 
ASSIGN 4,29t, SYSTEH BLOCK I , D ,  
SYSTEH4 QUEUE SY STEfi4 14B44 
GATE NU SYSTEH4 
SEIZE SYSTEtf4 
riAf<E 7 
SAVEVALUE 8, P7, F 
DEPART SYSTEM 
KEENTEF<';II TRANSFER ,050,OTfIER4, NICUH4 
OTHER4 TRANSFER . .305, L0CDH4, Hf COR4 
LOCDH4 ASSIGN 1 ~ 1  LO COtilfLEXITY I,t)JE;2) 
TRANSFER ,SELFTES4 
MCC0H4 ASSIGN 
TRANSFER 
NICOPf4 ASSIGN 
SKLFTES4 ADVANCE 
TF-ANSFER 
N ~ T ~ I L ~  ASSIGN 
TF(At4SFER 
FAIL4 ASSIGN 
SPAR4 TRAt4SFER 
1,2 HED CDHf LEXITY I. D. (52 )  
, SEtFTE54 
1,3 H I  CoMPiEXITV I. D. 152) 
4C,9 53 
.900, NOTAIL4,FAIL4 
2,O NONFAILURE I , D ,  ( S 4 )  
, Sf"AR4 
2,1 FAILURE I , D ,  (54) 
-600,  VERIr4, LOCOf F SS 
00295 VEF'IF4 ASSIGN 6,h  
002YL ONLIN4 QUEUE ONLIN4 
. . 
ONLINE TESTDLOCE 1, Dm 
TRANSFER P, 6,282 
TRANSFER , C O N T I M ~  
TRANSFEF: , CHCCE04 
TRANSFER ,CHECK04 
RECY CL4 DEPART PA 
ADVANCE 10 
TRANSFER ,WAITIN4 
Cl*-lECKO4 ASS I GN &,70 
WAITIN4 QUEUE PL 
GATE NU SYSTEM4,COHFAk4 
SCI ZE SYSTEt44 
ASSIGN 7 , i  
TRANSFER ,ADVANC4 ' 
COHfAR4 TEST E X8, F7, HECYCL4 
ADVANC4 ADVANCE 30,6 
TEST NC X8, P7, JURP4 
RELEASE SYSTEff4 
JUMP4 DCPAET P1 
ASSIGN 6- ,70 
DEf ART ONLIN4 
TKANSFEF; P, 2,318 
TRANSFER RFI 
TRANSFER P,1,313 
TRANSFER ,Of"FLINE 
TRANSFER , HASTOTF 
CONTIN4 ADVANCE 30,6 
TRANSFER P, 2,324 
TRANSFER ,RCTES4 
ADVANCE Q 
UPSTAT4 S f  LIT 1, OFFLINE 
DEPART ONLTM4 
RELEASE SY STEkf4 
TF:ANSFER , CMCCK 
RETES4 PRIORITY 1 
DEPART ONLTN4 
TF<ANSFCR , KEENT f R4 
GENERATE . 31001 FNCUEXPON, 5, t ,  7, F lil 
ADVANCE 13 
ASSIGN 4,356 SYSTEH BLOCK l , D m  
SYSTEHS QUEUE SYSTEW 2C44 
GATE NU SYSTEM 
SEIZE SYSTEM 
rrAr;f< 7 
SAVEVALUE 9,P7,F 
DEPART SYSTEM 
REENTERS TRANSFER .010,OT tER5, NICOHS 
OTtiERS TRANSFER .111, LOCDHS, MECOHS 
LOCOMS ASSI GN 191 LD COMPLEXITY 1-Dm (S2) 
ONLINE VERIFY S7 - SC 
TO SL 
TO 57 
TQ 'SC 
ONLINE VEFlIFY S7 - SC 
%%na%%nJ%n~~~l%%%%%%~%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%~%%%%%%%~%~~a%Q~~a%%%%%~~%%~u%~~~%~~~~a*~%%% 
00345 TRANSFER ,SCLFTCSS 
0034l ASS I Eb! 1,2 ffCD CQfiPLEXITY T,D.(S2) 
003.47 TRANSFER ,SCLFTESS 
00343 HICUM ASSIGN 1,3 - - MI COWLEXTTY LDAS2)  
00 345' SELFTESS ADVANCE 1?2,3G 53 
00350 TRANSFER . 7 o o , ~ o r n 1 ~ s ,  FAILS 
00351 ASSIGN 2,O NONfAfLURE I n D m  CS4) 
00352 TRANSFER , SPARS 
00353 FAIL5 ASSIGt.4 2 , l  FAILURE I. D. (54 1 
00354 SPARS TRANSFER . ~ S O , V C R I ~ S ,  LOCUFF s5 
00355 UERIES ASSIGN 6 ~ 6  ONLINE TESTELQCK I, D n  
0OZ5L ONLIt4f; QUEUE ONLINS 
00357 - TRANSFER P, 6,352 
00358 TRANSF'EFi , CONTINS 
00358 TRANSFER ,CHECK05 
003LO TRANSFER , CKECKOS 
003L1 RECYCLS DEPART PA 
00312 ADVANCE: 10 
003L3 TF<ANSFER , WAITINS 
00314 CHECK05 ASSIGN 6.: ,80 
00365 MAITINS LlUfUC P l  
003U GATE NU SYSTEMS, CQWPAr:S 
003L7 SEIZE SY STEtf5 
00368 ASSIGN 7 ~ 1  
00369 TKANSf ER , ADVANCS 
00370 COHFARS TEST E XP, P7, RtCYCLS 
00371 ADVANCS ADVANCE 60,12 
00372 TEST NE X?,P?,JUMf5 
00373 RELEASE SYSTEHS 
00374 @EF'AF:T PL 
00375 ASSIGN 6.-, 80 
0037L DEPART flNL1NS 
00377 TRANSFER P, 2,37C 
00378 TFiANSFER , HFI 
003'75' TRANSFER P, l ,  373 
00380 TRANSFER , OFFLINE 
00381 TRANSfEE ,HASfOTF 
00382 CONTINS ADVANCE 60,12 
00383 TRANSFER P, 2,384 
003C4 TRANSFW ,RCTESS 
003G5 AOVEififCE 0 
003G6 UfSTRTS SPLIT 1, DrFLINE 
00387 Df PART ONtINS 
003CE RELEASE SYSTEHS 
OOZE!? TRANSFER , CHECK 
00390 RETESS PRIORITY 1 
00371 D C F A ~ ~ T  ONLIMS 
00392 TRANSFER , KCENTERS 
00393 GENERATE 1440, FN6EXPON, 5,, ,7, F 
00344 ADVANCE 0 
ULOCK XFER NUPiBEK 
Sf. 
REPAIR  F L O W  M O D E L  
~ % 5 5 % 5 * % % ~ r L ~ r l . t % 5 % * r i c ~ ~ % ~ 5 % % ~ r t * ~ r ~ i ( t % - % r \ , r L 5 r \ , * . t 5 % 5 r ~ % ~ r t r ~ ~ r t ? c ~ ~ 5 % ' 1 , 5 % % ~ ~ ~ r \ , c t % % ' t % r t r L % % r ~ c ~ ~  
00375 ASS1 GN 4,411 SYSTEM BLOCK 1.D. 
0 0 3 4 1  SYSTEM& QUEUE SYSTEHL 2F17f) 
00377 GATE NU SYSTEM 
0035% SEIZE SYSTEiCtli - 
0037  9 MAriK 7 
00400 SAVEVALUE 10, PGF 
00401. DEF' AFiT SYSTEHb 
-
00402 REENTER6 TRANSFER -040, OTI:ERL, HICD#L 
00403 OTI.iER6 THANSTET< 135, LOCOHL, HCCDRL 
00404 LOCOHL ASSIGN 1 7 1  LO COHFLCXITY I. D. 1521 
00405 TRANSFER ,SCLFTESL 
00401  HfCQHL ASSIGN 1,2 MED COMPLEXITY f.D.(52) 
00407 TRANSFER ,SCLFTESL 
00400 RICOML ASSIGN 1 ~ 3  H I  COMPLEXITY 1.D. tS2) 
00409 SCLFTESL ADVANCE 116,23 . S3 
00410 TRANSFER .9LOFNOfAIL6,FAIL6 
00411 N f I r A I L l  ASSIGN 2 4  NOMrAILURE I.D. t S 4 )  
00412 TRANSFER . SPAR& 
00413 FAIL& ASSIGN 2 , l  FAILURE lmD.(S4) 
00414 SPAFiL TRANSFER • OLO, VCRITbp LOCOTF SC 
00415 VEF<IFL ASSIGN ONLINE TESTBLOCK I.D. 
00411  ONLINL QUEUE QNLINL 
TRANS~EK P,1,412 
TRANSFER ,CONTIN& 
TRANSFER , CHCCIs<OL 
TF:ANE;EEF: , CEiCCKOL 
RKCYCLB DEPART Ft 
ADVANCE: 10 
TRANSFER ,WAITIN1 
CMECKOL ASSIGN &,90 
WAITIN& QUCUf P 1  
GATE NLI SYSTEHPI, COMf AF:b 
SEIZE SY STEHtS 
ASSIGN 7 4  
TRANSFER ,ADVANCL 
COHF'kF:b TEST E XI#,  P7,RECYCL6 
ADVANCL ADVANCE 18,4 
TEST NC X l O ,  P?, JUPtPL 
RELEASE . SYETEHti 
JUEPCI DEPART FA 
ASSIGN 6- ,?O 
DEPART ONLf MA 
TRANSFER P, 2,438 
TRANSFER , KT1 
TRANSTER P, 6,433 
TRANSFER ,OTFLINE 
TRANSFER ,HASTOFF 
CONTINl ADVANCE 18,4 
TRANSFEF: P, 2,444 
TF<ANCFEF< , RCTES6 
ONLINE VERIFY 57 - SG 
REPAIR F L O W  M O D E L  -_ ---  
~ a ~ ~ a ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ n ~ r \ , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ % ~ r \ , ~ r ( , ~ ~ n ~ r \ , . t ~ % r \ , % ~ r \ , ~ % r i r r \ , ~ % m % ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r \ , % ~ r \ , ~ ~ ~ = ~ ~ % % % % n n % ~ %  
00445 ADVANCE 0 
00446 UPSTAT6 SPLIT I, OFFLINE 
00447 DCPkT:T QNt3Ct4L 
00443 RELEASE SYSTEM - 
00449 TRANSFER C I - ~ I I C ~  
00450 HCTESL PRfOF<ffY 1 -- 
00451 DEPART OMLIMC: 
00452 TRANSFER , REENTER6 
00453 OFF TERffINATE 1 
EXFDN FUNCTION KNl,C23 
MU, n O / m  1, m 1#4/.2, n222/m3f a355/P4t m5Or3Iu5, n&7/nAF=?151u?yls2~ 
.75, I a3C/m8F1~6/n84t11L83/~f3Ct2n i /m ' i ) t2m3/ .93y2~S2/m?4y2m8i /  
nP5?2.9~/m9LF3u2/M97t 3u5/PYEt 3= )31m9!?f 4.6!~!?!?5tSm-3/u!?5'8, 5-2/ 
.9?'1,8.0 
S T  ART I,, l 
KESCT 
START I,, l 
RESET 
START I,, I 
RESCT 
START 1. 
END 
APPENDIX B 
BLOCK COUNTS 
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APPENDIX C 
FACILITY STATISTICS 
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APPENDIX D 
QUEUE STATISTICS 
_
.
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I D  
I 9Y9TEnl 
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P RETAIN 
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b RePArR 
1 MASTOFF 
I SYSTEMZ 
9 DNLINZ 
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11 ONLlN3 
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APPENDIX E 
FIELD SURVEY SHEET 
(Facs imile) 

APPENDIX F 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
AEALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
System 2 Sample 
T.. 
N - 
zzy2 
Availability 
Observations 
1st QTR 
2nd QTR 
3rd QTB 
4th QTR 
T. j 
n j 
y2ij 
nj- 2 T.. 
N = &(109.93523) 
~reatments (Self-Test Accuracy-%) 
80 85 90 - 
1 
.866 .867 -890 
.863 -886 .886 
.849 -890 .884 
-869 .865 .870 
3.447 3.508 3.530 
4 4 4 
2.970687 3.07701 3.115452 
SST = zZy2 - T.. 2 
-- 
L T.. SSG = ET.f;i - -> 
*J N 
SSW = SST-SSG 
ANOVA SUMXARY TABLE 
MSG > F - 462 - 
MSW - m - 1-d;k-1;N-k 
Source of Variation 
Among Treatments 
Within Treatments 
TOTAL 
CONCLUSION: The hypothesis of equal means is rejected 
at the 5% level of significance and it is concluded that 
the mean system availability due to changes in self-test 
Sum of Squares 
.000924 
.000956 
..00188 
accuracy is significantly different than the mean availa-:. 
bility due to random failure deviations in the System 2 
sample. 
df 
2 
9 
11 
Mean Square 
.000462 
.000106 
APPENDIX G 
MULTI-REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
REGRESSION O A T &  C S Y S T E W  2 3  
Note: 
X1 = Self-Test Accuracy 
X2 = Spares Probability 
X3 = Performance Test 
Accuracy 
X4 = Diagnostic Test 
Accuracy 
Y = Observed Availability 
5 TESTS 48 SUBJECTS 
-+ - DETERHI it!tlf.jT = 70225&865767-1-'-- 
MULTIPLE R SQUARE = .12108924713 
W . J I P L E  R = .3477?88027021 a 
FOR ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON R = J,481045448204 
F'REi3ICTOR BETA . 8ETA SQ R(CRITEKION1 BETAW STRUCTURE-R 
I O m  35 O m  12 0 .-27 i 0,  09 0,78 
2 -0.17 0,03 -0,024 0-  00 -OW07 
3 -0.14 0 .0 l  -0,140 Q,01 -0 40 
4 0 -14  0 ,  02 O w  006 0.00 0. 01 
TEST 
WEIGHTS 
INTERCEPT CONSTANT = .7501000043023 
Predictor l(Self-Test Accuracy) is the best predictor of 
the criterion variable (Observed Availability) . 
The regression equation is : 
The full correlation matrix is shown on the next page. 
5 TESTS 
FOR SPHERICITY TEST, CHI-SRUAKE = 21.4724940088 AND NwDwF = 10 
FhCTQR EIGENUALUE PERCENT TRACE ' CUM PERCENT N.D.F CHI-SRUAR 
FACTOR PATTERN. FkCTOHS ARE COLUMNS, TESTS ARE ROWS. 
5 HOW 
TEST HUtT H SQUARE 
FACTOR SCORE COEFFICIENTS. FACTnKS ARE COLUMNS, TESTS ARE ROWS 
ROW 
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